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This thesis examines the discourse surrounding the debate over whether the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms ought to apply to First Nations’ governments 
in Canada.  This is a constitutional and legal grey area at present because Section 32 of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms stipulates that this constitutional 
document applies to the federal, provincial and territorial governments, but does not 
mention Aboriginal governments. The lack of constitutional clarity on this issue has 
generated a debate involving three schools of thought. The first school proposes that the 
Charter ought to apply to First Nations’ governments just as it does to other 
governments in Canada. The second school of thought argues that the Charter should 
not apply to First Nations’ governments because it is an imposition of western liberal 
values on their governments that could limit their self-governing authority. Proponents 
of this view assert that recognition of Aboriginal and treaty rights in the Constitution 
should entitle First Nations to develop their own rights practices, consistent with 
Aboriginal laws and customs. A third school of thought suggests that there may be 
alternatives between accepting the Charter as it is and rejecting it altogether. Two 
options have been advocated by this school. One option is for the Charter to apply with 
a caveat that it be done in a manner that is consonant with traditional Aboriginal laws 
and customs. The other option is that a parallel Aboriginal Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms be developed that better reflects Aboriginal traditions on rights.  While this 
debate has been ongoing, the Government of Canada and some First Nations have 
entered into self-governing agreements that acknowledge the application of the 
Canadian Charter to those particular governments. This thesis concludes that there is no 
easy resolution to the debate, that it may take the courts to resolve the issue in law, and 
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 An important debate is taking place in Canada today over whether the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter) should apply to First Nations’ 
jurisdiction.  First Nations’ people are seeking greater control over their affairs through 
modern treaties and administrative agreements. In return, they are being asked by the 
federal government to agree to the application of the Charter to their governments.  A 
debate has unfolded, within and beyond First Nations, about whether the Charter ought 
to apply to First Nations’ jurisdiction. This is a grey area in the law at present because 
although Section 32 of the Charter stipulates that this constitutional document applies to 
the federal, provincial and territorial governments,1 it does not mention First Nations’ 
governments.  
Aboriginal people, and particularly First Nations people, have always had their 
traditional forms of government in Canada. They have also had their own laws and 
customs respecting individuals’ rights within the community. They do not necessarily 
accept Ottawa’s conceptualization of what form their governments should take, nor 
whether national laws like the Charter should apply to their jurisdiction.  One school of 
                                                 
1 Section 32 of the Constitution Act, 1982 states: “This Charter applies (a) to the Parliament and 
government of Canada in respect of all matters within the authority of Parliament including all matters 
relating to the Yukon Territory and Northwest Territories; and (b) to the legislatures and governments of 
each province in respect of all matters within the authority of the legislature of each province.” 
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thought argues that the Charter is an imposition or impingement on First Nations’ right 
to self-governance and their sovereignty. The supporters of this view believe that 
Aboriginal and treaty rights should allow First Nations to set their own standards of 
rights protection on First Nations’ land in accordance with their traditional laws and 
customs. 
A second school of thought does not share the same degree of concerns about the 
Charter’s potential negative impact. This school of thought argues that the Charter 
should apply equally to all Canadians, that First Nations’ members should have the same 
rights vis-à-vis their governments as they have against the federal and provincial 
governments. The 1996 Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) shared this 
point of view; it recommended that the Charter should apply to First Nations’ 
governments. Some scholars goes so far as to suggest that the Charter can assist with the 
struggle toward greater self-government. John Borrows, for example, examined three 
circumstances where he suggests that the Charter assisted First Nations people in the 
struggle for self-determination.2 
 A third school of thought proposes that there may be common ground between 
these two schools of thought insofar as the individual rights in the Charter can apply in a 
manner that respects Aboriginal and treaty rights. Within this school of thought, a 
proposal has been developed for an Aboriginal Charter of Rights and Freedoms as an 
alternative to the Charter. 
                                                 
2 See John Borrows in “Contemporary Traditional Equality: The Effect of the Charter on First Nations 
Politics”, in Charting the Consequences: The Impact of the Charter of Rights on Canadian Law and 
Politics”, ed. David Schneiderman and Kate Sutherland , (University of Toronto Press, 1997), 169-185. 
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 This thesis reviews the primary arguments articulated by each school of thought. 
It also examines recent treaties and administrative agreements to see how this issue is 
being addressed by the federal government and some First Nations across Canada today. 
 
1.1 Importance of the Debate 
 The debate as to whether the Charter ought to apply to First Nations’ 
governments is important for at least three groups of people. First, it is important for 
First Nations’ leaders seeking greater self-governing authority who are being asked 
directly by the federal government to accept the application of the Charter to their 
governments. They will be interested in the arguments on all sides of this debate to help 
guide their positions and decisions regarding the application of the Charter in the future. 
Second, the debate is important for citizens who are governed under First Nations’ 
jurisdiction. They will want to know whether they have the same rights vis-à-vis their 
First Nations’ governments as they have against the federal, provincial and territorial 
governments. Third, the debate is important for non-Aboriginal Canadians, especially 
those who believe either that the Charter embodies important legal principles and moral 
values that should apply equally to all Canadians, regardless of their ancestry, or that it 
is a “crucial symbol of citizenship”3 that defines and unifies Canada. Ultimately, the 
debate regarding the applicability of the Charter is important because the outcome will 
signal whether First Nations’ governance systems will be based on their own framework 
of rights and freedoms, whether they will share part of the same rights framework as 
other Canadians, or whether there will be a blending of legal traditions on this question. 
                                                 
3 Alan C. Cairns, Citizens Plus – Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian State, (Vancouver-Toronto: UBC 




1.2 Central Objectives and Research Questions 
The central objective of this thesis is to examine the primary arguments 
surrounding this debate. It examines the views of First Nations’ leaders as well as those 
of several academic and legal scholars.  Some attention is devoted to the position of the 
federal government and RCAP. In keeping with that objective, this thesis addresses the 
following research questions:  
i. What are the concerns of the school of thought that opposes the 
application of the Charter? 
ii. What is the response to these concerns by others? What are the arguments 
that support the application of the Charter to First Nations’ governments 
and communities? 
iii. What are the arguments made by those who maintain that the Charter can 
apply in a manner that respects Aboriginal cultural traditions?  
iv. What does the series of recent treaties and agreements signed by some 
First Nations and the federal government reveal regarding what has been 
happening and what is likely to happen in the near future regarding the 
application of the Charter?  
 
1.3 Scope and Limitations of Thesis 
This thesis focuses exclusively on the application of the Charter to First Nations’ 
governance in Canada today. Broader Aboriginal governance issues are beyond the 
scope of this thesis. For the purposes of this thesis, First Nations’ people are those 
individuals who are defined by Section 91(24) of the British North America Act, 1867 as 
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“Indians”.4  Any references to Inuit peoples will be explicit. The thesis does not examine 
the special concerns of Métis peoples, which are best left to another study. The phrase 
‘Aboriginal’ will be used occasionally to embrace all Aboriginal groups. There may be 
occasional references to confederacies or tribal councils where groups of First Nations 
have aggregated for the purposes of a treaty or an administrative agreement.  
Furthermore, the thesis does not evaluate the merits of First Nations’ self-
government or the devolution of either jurisdiction or programs to First Nations’ 
governments. It accepts that some Canadians, regardless of their ancestry, believe that 
self-government is an important key to economic success and social development,5 
while others believe that it is a step in the wrong direction which may impede such 
development.6  
For the purposes of this thesis, First Nations’ governments are defined as 
“distinct political communities having territorial boundaries within which their authority 
is exclusive.”7 The thesis concurs with Anna Hunter’s proposition that there is a “linear 
continuum” of forms of self-government “from self-regulation to constitutional self-
government to self-determination to tribal sovereignty to secessionist independence.”8  
The thesis focuses on First Nations’ governments that accept some jurisdiction of the 
                                                 
4 B.N.A. Act, 1867, Section 91(24), found at: 
http://www.solon.org/Constitutions/Canada/English/ca_1867.html. 
5 Stephen Cornell and Joseph Kalt. “Sovereignty and Nation-building: The Development Challenge in 
Indian Country Today” in American Indian Culture and Research Journal. Volume 22:3. Cornell and 
Kalt’s central thesis is that stronger governance measures leads to greater economic independence for First 
Nations. 
6 Thomas Flanagan. First Nations? Second Thoughts., McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000. Also see 
Canadian Federation of Taxpayers, “Apartheid: Canada’s Ugly Secret”, Tanis Fiss, Director of Centre for 
Aboriginal Policy Change, April 2004. This paper proposes discontinuation of the reserve system in 
favour of fee simple. 
7  Dan Russell. A People’s Dream – Aboriginal Self-Government in Canada, (UBC Press, Vancouver-
Toronto, 2000), 16. Attributed to Chief Justice Marshall in Worcester v Georgia, 31 U.S. (6. Pet.) 515 
(1831). 
8 Anna Hunter. “Politics of Aboriginal Self-Government”, in Canadian Politics: Critical Reflections, ed. 
Joan Grace and Byron Sheldrick,  Pearson, to be published in 2006, 10. 
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Government of Canada over their affairs9 and it assumes that most First Nations see 
their future within Canada with some degree of overlapping laws and institutions.10 It 
does not include a review of those First Nations who have not acceded to Canadian 
jurisdiction.11  RCAP conceptualized self-government as follows: 
Of course, self-government may take a variety of forms. For some peoples, it 
may mean establishing distinct governmental institutions on an ‘exclusive’ 
territory. For others, it may mean setting up a public government generally 
connected with modern treaties or land claims agreements. Alternatively, self-
government may involve sharing power in joint governmental institutions, with 
guaranteed representation for the nations and peoples involved. In other 
instances, it may involve setting up culturally specific institutions and services 
within a broader framework of public government.12 
RCAP explained how many Aboriginal people consider the value of traditional forms of 
governance and “continue to be guided, to some degree, by traditional outlooks in their 
approach to matters of governance.”13  Whereas in some cases these traditional 
governments have been replaced or imposed upon by the Indian Act, in other cases 
important elements of traditional forms of government remain. Some people, the 
Commission authors wrote, identify with their Indian Act band as a nation, while others 
“identify the nation on the basis of a broader traditional affiliation, for example, Cree, 
                                                 
9 For a discussion of those who do not accept Canada’s jurisdiction, see Darlene Johnston in “The Quest 
of the Six Nation’ Confederacy for Self-Determination”, University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review, 
Vol. 44 – No. 1, (Winter, 1986), 1-31. Johnston chronicles how Six Nations Confederacy never 
surrendered its sovereignty and accordingly, it should be treated on a nation-to-nation basis as defined in 
international law. 
10 See Ronald Beiner in Liberalism, Nationalism, Citizenship: Essays on the Problem of Political 
Community, (Vancouver-Toronto: UBC Press, 2003), 173. Beiner reminds Canadians that in the lead-up to 
the Quebec referendum, Quebec First Nations’ voted overwhelmingly to stay a part of Canada. The vote 
was 95 - 99% against separation. 
11 See Darlene Johnston arguments noted above. 
12 Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Final Report, 1996. Chapter 3 – Governance, Section  1- 1.1. 
13 RCAP. Section 1 – 1.1. 
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Mohawk, Gitksan, Kwakwa ka’ waka and Dene. Some First Nations refer to themselves 
as treaty nations because they have made treaties with the Crown.” 14 
1.4 Methodology 
 The information for this thesis is drawn from four major sources. The first source 
is the recent literature produced by both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal scholars that 
deals explicitly with the interface between Charter rights and Aboriginal rights. The 
second source is the media reports that provide useful insights into the positions of 
various stakeholders and the discourse that surrounds them. The third source is various 
government documents such as the RCAP Final Report that reviews government policies 
related to the application of the Charter to First Nations. The fourth source is the 
contemporary treaties and administration agreements in the post-1993 era for which the 
application of the Charter was a key consideration. 
 
1.5 Organization of the Thesis 
 In addition to this introductory chapter, the thesis consists of six other chapters. 
Chapter 2 reviews Canada’s liberal democratic traditions regarding individual and group 
rights and freedoms and how this debate fits into those traditions. It provides a summary 
of the provisions of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and reviews Section 
35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 which “recognized and affirmed”15 Aboriginal and 
                                                 
14 RCAP, 3 – 3.1. 
15 Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, as amended, states: “(1) The existing aboriginal and treaty 
rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed. (2) In this Act, "aboriginal 
peoples of Canada" includes the Indian, Inuit, and Metis peoples of Canada. (3) For greater certainty, in 
subsection (1) "treaty rights" includes rights that now exist by way of land claims agreements or may be so 
acquired. (4) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the aboriginal and treaty rights referred to in 
subsection (1) are guaranteed equally to male and female persons.” 
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treaty rights in 1982 and related sections. This chapter notes that since 1982, federal, 
provincial and Aboriginal governments have attempted to spell out these rights in the 
Constitution without a great deal of success.  
Chapter 3 examines the concerns of those who believe that the application of the 
Charter has adverse ramifications for First Nations’ jurisdiction. In particular, it 
examines the concern that the Charter is an imposition of western liberal values that 
could threaten Aboriginal customs and traditions and could limit the ability of First 
Nations’ peoples to be self-governing. This chapter also identifies some of the 
governance issues within Aboriginal communities that might be open to challenge under 
the Charter. 
 Chapter 4 examines the position of those who support the application of the 
Charter to First Nations’ governments.  Their basic position is that the Charter should 
apply to First Nations’ governments just as it applies to other levels of government. This 
school of thought was bolstered by RCAP’s recommendation that the Charter should 
apply to First Nations’ governments.  
Chapter 5 examines the common ground between the two schools of thought on 
the application of the Charter to First Nations’ governments. Many scholars, Aboriginal 
and non-Aboriginal alike, accept that some form of individual rights protection on First 
Nations’ jurisdiction is inevitable. Many scholars believe that the preservation of 
Indigenous cultures in Canada is an important social good even if this means limiting 
individual rights in some circumstances. Some theorists believe that Section 25 of the 
Charter, which serves as direction to the judiciary to ensure that important cultural laws, 
traditions, languages and values are protected from attack by the Charter, offers the best 
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hope in the short term for balancing individual rights with Aboriginal rights.16  This 
chapter examines the possibility of developing an Aboriginal Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms rights to replace the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in areas of 
First Nations’ jurisdiction. The chapter also highlights the views expressed by some who 
suggests that while the Canadian constitution and law may have some application to 
First Nations’ governments established under the Indian Act, it should not apply to 
traditional or inherency governments that have not acceded to Canadian jurisdiction.17 
 Chapter 6 examines several treaty or administrative agreements concluded 
between the federal government and approximately thirteen First Nations governments 
since 1993 which acknowledged that the Charter will apply to these governments. The 
acceptance of the Charter in these instances may signal a shift in position for some First 
Nations’ leaders. This chapter notes, however, that only a small fraction of Canada’s 
First Nations has agreed to the application of the Charter to their jurisdiction. For most 
First Nations this issue remains unresolved.  
 Chapter 7 provides a summary of the findings of the thesis and some concluding 
observations regarding the current and future debate on the application of the Charter to 
First Nations’ governments. The major conclusion is that the debate regarding the 
application of the Charter to First Nations’ governments is not over, it remains hotly 
contested within some First Nations’ communities, and that the courts are likely to 
                                                 
16 Section 25 of the Constitution Act, 1982 states: The guarantee in this Charter of certain rights and 
freedoms shall not be construed so as to abrogate or derogate from any aboriginal, treaty or other rights or 
freedoms that pertain to the aboriginal peoples of Canada including (a) any rights or freedoms that have 
been recognized by the Royal Proclamation of October 7, 1763; and (b) any rights or freedoms that may 
be acquired by the aboriginal peoples of Canada by way of land claims settlement. 
17 See Darlene Johnston, in “Six Nations”, 1- 31.  
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intervene in this question. A resolution to the debate is important for all Aboriginal and 





The Rights Tradition in Canada: The Charter and Other Constitutional 
Developments (1982-1992) 
 
2. 0 Introduction 
  
 Canada has a history as a western liberal democracy with a particular interest in 
human rights. It was a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. 
Parliament passed a Canadian Bill of Rights in 1960 and each province and territory has 
a human rights act.  From 1980 to 1982 Canada underwent a process of patriating its 
central constitutional document, the B.N.A. Act, 1867. At the time, Prime Minister Pierre 
Trudeau was determined to include a charter of rights within the new Constitution Act. 
Although Canada already had a Bill of Rights, it was not entrenched in the Constitution 
and it only applied to the federal government. As a consequence, it was seldom used in 
advancing or safeguarding the human rights of Canadian citizens. Unlike the Bill of 
Rights the new Charter was to clearly have supremacy over other laws enacted by the 
federal and provincial governments.  
At the time Trudeau was seeking to achieve the inclusion of the Charter in the 
Constitution Act, 1982, Aboriginal leaders were seeking constitutional recognition of 
their claims and rights. These leaders won a hard-fought battle when Ottawa and the 
provinces decided late in the patriation process to include recognition of Aboriginal and 
rights in the Constitution.18 This thesis is about the intersection of these two events, 
                                                 
18 See “Some Perspectives on the Origin and Meaning of Section of the Constitution Act, 1982”, found at: 
http://oldfraser.lexi.net/publications/pps/41/s4_meaning.html. Also see Roy Romanow, John Whyte and 
Howard Leeson in Canada…Notwithstanding: The Making of the Constitution 1976-1982. (Toronto: 
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inclusion of the Charter and recognition of the group rights of Aboriginal peoples. This 
chapter reviews the provisions of the Charter in the context of Canada’s traditions as a 
liberal democracy. It explains the provisions of the Constitution Act, 1982 that 
recognized and affirmed Aboriginal rights and it briefly reviews the constitutional 
negotiations between 1982 and 1992 that attempted to define Aboriginal rights with 
greater precision. 
 
2.1 Canada’s Liberal Democratic Traditions 
 Citizens’ rights against the government date back at least as far as the Magna 
Carta of 1215. J. S. Mill, arguably the father of modern liberalism, said in On Liberty 
and Other Essays that individuals are sovereign over themselves and that government 
ought not to interfere with this liberty except to “prevent harm to others.”19 Some 
believe that individual rights are “political trumps” that are held by individuals against 
the excesses of government and that hold government to account before the courts.20 
Citizen rights include the right to liberty and equality. 21 A right against the government, 
Ronald Dworkin suggests, is a right “to do something even when the majority thinks it 
would be wrong to do it.”22   
Will Kymlicka is a contemporary political philosopher who has built on the 
traditions of Mill and Dworkin when it comes to articulating modern liberalism. In 
Liberalism, Community and Culture, 23 he suggests that liberal democratic governments 
                                                                                                                                                
Carswell/Metheun, 1984), 212 and 268-269. At page 212, the authors credit “ongoing political and legal 
actions in London by native organizations” for the inclusion of Section 35 into the new Constitution Act. 
19 J. S. Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 14. 
20 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), xi. 
21 Dworkin, 266. 
22 Dworkin, 194. 
23 Will Kymlicka. Liberalism Community and Culture,( Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989). 
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must treat people with “equal concern and respect.”24 This means granting rights to 
citizens to protect them against infringements on their freedom. Examples of such rights 
include the right not to be unlawfully or arbitrarily detained by state officials, the right to 
speak out against one’s government, and the right to vote. Majorities have rights to enact 
laws consistent with their values, but majorities ought not to abuse their dominant power 
against minorities. Alexis de Tocqueville referred to the misuse of majority power 
against a minority as the “tyranny of the majority.”25  
Canada has followed these liberal democratic principles for many years. In 
particular, after the Second World War, Canada agreed to the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights and in 1960, its Parliament passed a Canadian Bill of Rights. In the 1960s 
and 1970s most provinces enacted human rights codes and established commissions to 
enforce these codes. Central to these liberal traditions are the principles enshrined in the 
Charter that Canadians are free from government intervention, unless those 
interventions are justified in law, and that Canadians are equal before and under the law.  
 
2.2 The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
The Charter of Rights and Freedoms was proclaimed in 1982 as part of the 
patriation of the BNA Act, 1867. For the first time in history, Canadians had codified 
rights which were guaranteed in the Constitution. The Charter was preceded in Canada 
by the Canadian Bill of Rights which had been enacted by Parliament in 1960.  The Bill 
of Rights contained many of the rights and values later included in the Charter, with one 
notable difference: the Bill of Rights was quasi-constitutional in nature; it was not 
                                                 
24 Kymlicka, 13. 
25 See Alexis de Tocqueville in Democracy in America, (Vintage Books, 1954).  
 14
entrenched in Canada’s Constitution. It was passed as a piece of federal legislation and 
therefore could be amended or repealed by another Parliament. It did not apply to the 
actions of the provinces and while prior inconsistent legislation could be struck down 
under that statute, Parliament could pass subsequent laws notwithstanding the Bill of 
Rights. 26 Consequently, the Bill of Rights was seldom used. 27  
Pierre Trudeau was determined to fix this shortcoming when the BNA Act, 1867 
was patriated in 1982. He wanted a charter of rights embedded in the Constitution that 
would have paramountcy over federal, provincial and territorial laws in Canada.  He 
ultimately achieved his goal when the Parliament of Canada and nine of the provinces 
agreed to his proposals in November 1981.28 
A complete listing of the provisions of the Charter is found in Appendix 1.29 For 
the purposes of this thesis it is important to note that the Charter protects fundamental 
freedoms – the right to free expression, free assembly, and a free press (Section 2); it 
provides for democratic rights– the right to vote in elections and run for office (Sections 
3-5); it allows citizens the mobility to live and work anywhere in Canada (Section 6); it 
offers important legal rights upon arrest – the right to a free and fair trial, the right not to 
incriminate oneself, the right to be free from cruel punishment (Sections 7-14); it 
provides for equality among citizens (Section 15); and it recognizes Canada’s two 
official languages (Sections 16-22). The Charter also protects group rights. It recognizes 
Canada’s multicultural heritage (Section 27); it ensures equality as between genders 
                                                 
26 See Peter Hogg in Constitutional Law in Canada. (Toronto: Carswell Company Limited, 1977), 431 to 
441. Hogg notes that in only one case, R v Drybones  [1970] SCR 282, did the courts strike down 
inconsistent legislation, in that case a provision of the Indian Act. 
27 Hogg, 433.  
28 Quebec dissented. See http://www.pco-
bcp.gc.ca/aia/default.asp?Language=E&Page=consfile&Sub=ThehistoryofConstitution#patriation, 
retrieved July 24, 2005. 
29 Also found at: http://www.solon.org/Constitutions/Canada/English/ca_1982.html. 
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(Section 28); and it protect minority languages where numbers warrant it (Sections 23). 
The Charter is enforced by the courts in Canada (Section 24). Relevant to this thesis, the 
Charter applies to the federal, provincial and territorial governments (Section 32); it 
does not apply to the private actions of citizens. The Charter may be overridden by the 
federal or provincial governments using the “notwithstanding” clause (Section 33).  
 
2.3 Rights are consistent with our International obligations 
These rights are consistent with several international human rights instruments to 
which Canada is a signatory. These include the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, 
1948, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1958, 
the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 
1960, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1976, the Declaration on 
Race and Racial Prejudice, 1978 and the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 
1989.30   
The Universal Declaration on Human Rights, 1948, for example, sets out a regime 
of rights that form a “common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations.”31 
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1965 
commits signatory countries to take “effective measure to review 
governmental…policies, and to…nullify any laws and regulations which have the effect 
of creating or perpetuating racial discrimination wherever it exists.”32 Each state has an 
                                                 
30 See Human Rights: A Compilation of International Instruments. Vol. I. (New York: United Nations, 
2002). 
31 United Nations. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Resolution, 1948, 217A(III), 1948. Preamble. 
32 United Nations. International Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
1958. Resolution 2106 A (XX), 1965. 
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obligation to “prohibit and bring to an end…racial discrimination by any persons, group 
or organization.”33 
Christine Chinkin notes that U.N. documents have been ratified “by states from all 
geographic areas and religious and political ideologies.”34 In other words, they represent 
a global perspective on rights and values. Chapter 3 will examine other international 
instruments that protect minority and Indigenous cultures from erosion by the majority 
members of a state.35 Some have argued that internationally-accepted human rights 
“provide a yardstick against which to assess governmental performance or non-
performance.”36 As Emilio Mignone once observed, “The defence of human dignity 
knows no boundaries.”37 
To summarize, there are those who suggest that liberal democratic rights 
represent an international consensus respecting individual rights and their relationship to 
government. Signatory states to international agreements of this kind are obligated to 
honour the principles enshrined in the agreements and to demonstrate that they are being 
respected. States who fail to live up to the ideals reflected in these provisions are seen as 
having less legitimacy than those who do, some would argue.  The Government of 
Canada prides itself on being a leader in promoting human rights at the international 
level38 even though it has also been criticized for its treatment of Aboriginal peoples.39 
                                                 
33 U.N. Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.  
34 Christine Chinkin, “International Law and Human Rights,” in Human Rights Fifty Years On: A 
Reappraisal. Ed. Tony Evans. (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1998), 105. 
35 Dan Russell is one such advocate. He makes this argument in A People’s Dream: Aboriginal Self-
Government in Canada, (Vancouver-Toronto: UBC Press, 2000), 122-123. 
36 Chinkin 120. 
37 Quoted by Andrew G. McGrew in “Human Rights in the Global Age: Coming to terms with 
globalization”, in Human Rights Fifty Years On: A Reappraisal. ed. Tony Evans. (Manchester and New 
York, Manchester University Press), 197.  
38 See http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/canada-magazine/issue01/1t6-en.asp, retrieved, July 23, 2005. 
39 See 1998 Annual Report of the Canadian Human Rights Commission at http://www.chrc-
ccdp.ca/publications/1998_ar/page7-en.asp as well as the Mennonite Central Committee human rights 
 17
2.4 Application of Charter to First Nations’ Peoples 
 As indicated earlier, First Nations’ people have Charter rights as citizens of 
Canada against the federal and provincial governments. They have free speech and free 
expression; they may vote in elections, they have mobility throughout Canada, they have 
legal rights upon arrest and they cannot be denied equality. This thesis explores the 
debate about whether they should possess similar rights against their own governments, 
whatever form those governments may take.40 If the Charter were applied to First 
Nations’ jurisdiction, legally, those citizens would have the right to freely criticize those 
governments without fear of reprisal, they could vote in elections if qualified, they 
would have mobility rights, important legal rights if arrested by band police, and 
equality rights on reserves. This is not to suggest that First Nations’ governments are 
currently infringing these rights; the examples are hypothetical only. Nor is this to 
suggest that First Nations’ peoples are without rights. They may possess some of these 
rights through customary law or through First Nations’ constitutions. Indeed, according 
to their Aboriginal traditions, they may have rights that exceed the Charter. The 
argument is that having the Charter apply to First Nations’ governance would codify 
these rights in law and provide constitutional supremacy for these rights, subject to the 
limitations in the Charter.   
 
2.5 Aboriginal Rights – Sections 35 and 25 
                                                                                                                                                
website at www.mcc.org. This committee is quoted as saying: “A UN committee has identified Canada's 
treatment of Aboriginal people as ‘the most pressing human rights issue facing Canadians’." Overall, 
Aboriginal people in Canada are poorer, less literate, less healthy and more highly represented in Canada's 
prisons than any other group. See http://www.mcc.org/canada/peace/article-election.html, retrieved July 
24, 2005. 
40 See discussion on various forms of Aboriginal government in Chapter 1. 
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 Parallel to the inclusion of the Charter into the Constitution Act, 1982 were the 
efforts by First Nations’ leaders to have their Aboriginal rights recognized. The failure 
to recognize these rights in the early rounds of constitutional negotiations between 
Ottawa and the provinces was a major oversight. When the constitutional accord was re-
opened to guarantee gender equality in the later part of 1981, First Nations’ leaders 
insisted on recognition of their rights as well.41 Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 
was ultimately included to recognize Aboriginal rights in Canada. It reads as follows: 
35. (1) The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of 
Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.  
(2) In this Act, "aboriginal peoples of Canada" includes the Indian, Inuit, and 
Métis peoples of Canada.  
This section falls outside the Charter. Aboriginal and treaty rights are not rights that are 
granted as Charter rights. They are rights that have been recognized as pre-existing, that 
have equal status with the rights of the federal, provincial and territorial governments. 
 In fact, special measures were taken to ensure that Charter rights did not 
compromise Aboriginal rights. It was precisely for this purpose that Section 25 of the 
Charter reads as follows: 
25. The guarantee in this Charter of certain rights and freedoms shall not be 
construed so as to abrogate or derogate from any aboriginal, treaty or other rights 
or freedoms that pertain to the aboriginal peoples of Canada including  
(a) any rights or freedoms that have been recognized by the Royal Proclamation 
of October 7, 1763; and  
                                                 
41 For a more complete description of First Nations and other Aboriginal leaders’ efforts to include 
Aboriginal rights in the Constitution, see “Some Perspectives on the Origin and Meaning of Section 35 of 
the Constitution Act, 1982”, found at: http://oldfraser.lexi.net/publications/pps/41/s3_origin.html. Also see 
Romanow, Whyte and  Leeson in Canada…Notwithstanding, 212. 
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(b) any rights or freedoms that may be acquired by the aboriginal peoples of 
Canada by way of land claims settlement. 
Section 25 is referred to as the ‘non-abrogation, non-derogation’ clause later in the 
thesis. 
 
2.6 Does the Charter apply to First Nations? 
For the purposes of this thesis, a third important section of the Constitution Act, 
1982 is Section 32. It reads: 
32. (1) This Charter applies  
(a) to the Parliament and government of Canada in respect of all matters within 
the authority of Parliament including all matters relating to the Yukon Territory 
and Northwest Territories; and  
(b) to the legislatures and governments of each province in respect of all matters 
within the authority of the legislature of each province.  
There is no reference in Section 32 either to First Nations’ governments or municipal 
governments. Kent McNeil contends that if Canada had intended to include other forms 
of government like First Nations’ governments, they would have broadened this wording 
to include all forms of governance in Canada.42 In the absence of this recognition, he 
argues, the wording is so specific that it is clear that political leaders intended the 
Charter to apply only to those administrations listed. Any doubt in this regard should be 
decided in favour of Aboriginal peoples, McNeil suggests.43  
                                                 
42Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Governments and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms”, in 
Osgoode Hall Law Review, Volume 34, Issue No. 1, (Spring 1996), 69. 
43 McNeil, 69. 
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J. Y. Sakej Henderson agrees. He argues that Section 25, the non-derogation 
clause, provides “a protective zone from the colonialists’ rights paradigm”44 and creates 
judicial and legislative immunity for First Nations from actions under the Charter. 
Henderson asserts, in line with McNeil’s arguments, that Section 25 “constitutionally 
assures Aboriginal peoples that the courts will not apply the personal rights of the 
Charter” in a manner that abrogates or derogates from Aboriginal and treaty rights.45  
 
2.7 The Corbiere Decision - 1999. 
While the Supreme Court of Canada has not specifically deliberated on the issue 
of whether the Charter applies to First Nations’ governments, it came close in the 
decision of John Corbiere et al. v. Her Majesty the Queen and the Batchewana Indian 
Band. 46  The Court was asked to review the Batchewana band’s decision to deny voting 
rights to band members who lived off-reserve. The criteria for electors within the band 
had been established pursuant to Section 77(1) of the Indian Act that required electors to 
be “ordinarily resident of the band”. The Court determined that this provision 
discriminated against non-residents of the band under Section 15 of the Charter, the 
equality rights section, and the court ordered the Government of Canada to rectify this 
disadvantage by amending the Indian Act. The Batchewana band did not present 
arguments in this case to the effect that the provision that disenfranchised non-residents 
was saved by virtue of Sections 35 and 25. Therefore, the Court did not have to rule 
specifically on whether the Charter applied to First Nations. It did find that the Indian 
                                                 
44 James Y. Henderson, “Empowering Treaty Federalism” in Saskatchewan Law Review, Volume 58(2), 
(1994), 286. 
45 Henderson, 286. 
46 Corbiere, et al v Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs) and the Batchewana Indian Band [1999] 2 S.C.R. 
203, 1999 CanLII 687 (S.C.C.) 
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Act must comply with Section 15 and one could extrapolate that, by implication, Indian 
bands which operate under the auspices of the Indian Act are subject to the Charter.47 
Two other lower level court decisions made similar findings. In Scrimbitt v. Sakimay 
Indian Band Council (1999)48, Scrimbitt was denied the right to vote in a band election 
because she was a Bill C-31 Indian. A Federal Court Justice found that the actions of the 
Band violated Section 15 of the Charter, the equality rights section. In Horse Lake First 
Nation v. Horseman49, a group of women occupied the local band office and the band 
applied to the courts for an order to evict them. An Alberta Queen’s Bench Justice held 
that the Charter should apply to any decision of the band. These are lower level 
decisions and the Indian bands did not argue in these cases that their Aboriginal rights 
under Section 35 superseded the Charter rights being claimed by the plaintiffs. The 
courts therefore did not directly address the intersection of Aboriginal rights and Charter 
rights. 
Until the Supreme Court of Canada is specifically asked to make a ruling on 
whether Charter rights apply to First Nations residents, this issue remains a grey area in 
law, particularly given the lack of reference to First Nations’ governments in Section 32 
of the Constitution Act, 1982. One possible outcome, based on an interpretation of the 
Corbiere decision, is that First Nations’ governments that are established pursuant to the 
Indian Act will be subjected to the rigors of the Charter; inherency governments may 
                                                 
47 See analysis at http://www.anishinabek.ca/uoi/roj_0310.htm, downloaded July 24, 2005. Additionally, 
in a public policy paper in 2004, Ian Peach of the University of Regina, Saskatchewan Institute of Public 
Policy suggests that off-reserve First Nations people could utilize the Charter against the Federal 
government if they are denied services by the Federal government because they are no longer resident on 
the reserve. By extrapolation again, such an argument could be made against a band government that 
similarly denied services to its members living off-reserve. See Saskatchewan Institute of Public Policy, 
“The Charter of Rights and Off-Reserve First Nations People: A Way to Fill the Public Policy Vacuum.” 
Ian Peach, author. Public Policy Paper 24, University of Regina, (March 2004). 
48 Scrimbitt v. Sakimay Indian Band Council (1999)48 2000 1 CNLR 205. 
49 Horse Lake First Nation v. Horseman [2003] 2 CNLR 193. 
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well be exempted.50 Kent McNeil, who argues that the Charter does not apply to First 
Nations, has also discouraged “judicial activism” in making such a finding.51 He 
believes this issue should be left to further investigation and negotiation. 
 
2.8 Defining Aboriginal Rights 
As far back as the 1987 First Ministers’ Conference, Ottawa proposed that the 
Charter ought to apply to First Nations’ governments and that they should have access 
to Section 33, the “notwithstanding clause”.52 After Section 35 was inserted into the 
Constitution Act, 1982, Ottawa and the provinces committed to holding a series of 
conferences with Aboriginal leaders to discuss and define the rights set out in Section 
35. Very early on, Aboriginal leaders began raising concerns about the potential for 
conflict between Aboriginal rights and Charter rights. A subsequent tri-lateral 
conference in 1983 was successful in bringing about four amendments to the 
Constitution Act, 1982 including a guarantee of equality rights in all matters pertaining 
to Aboriginal jurisdiction.53 Three subsequent First Ministers’ conferences were held in 
1984, 1985 and 1987 for the purposes of defining Section 35 and each failed to achieve 
consensus on changes to the Constitution Act, 1982. The Meech Lake Accord followed 
                                                 
50 Patrica Monture-Angus makes the point in Journeying Forward, Dreaming of First Nations 
Independence, (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 1999). She asserts “It would be an odd conclusion if 
government whose independent authority originates outside of any Crown action were forced to submit to 
the discipline of the Charter, itself a Crown Act.”, 150. 
51 McNeil in Aboriginal Governments, 98. 
52 See a summary of these events at: http://www.sicc.sk.ca/saskindian/a87sum30.htm.  
53 Four amendments to the Constitution Act, 1982 were agreed to in 1983. Section 25(b) was amended to 
add the words: “any rights or freedoms that now exist by way of land claims agreements or may so be 
acquired.” Section 35 was amended to add a subsection (4) to read: “Notwithstanding other provisions of 
this Act, the aboriginal and treaty rights referred to in subsection (1) are guaranteed equally to male and 
female persons.” Section 35 was also amended to allow for the convening of a First Ministers’ Conference 
with Aboriginal leaders before any amendments that affect Aboriginal peoples could be introduced. 
Section 37 was amended to delete the words “identification and definition” and add the words 
“constitutional matters that directly affect” Aboriginal peoples. 
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in 1987 to address the concerns of Quebec’s status within the federation; Aboriginal 
issues were excluded from these discussions. In 1992, at Charlottetown, Ottawa and the 
provinces agreed to amend the Constitution Act, 1982 substantively. Aboriginal leaders 
insisted that their issues be recognized as part of this process. Canadian political leaders 
agreed. The Charlottetown Accord proposed that the Constitution Act, 1982 be amended 
“to recognize that the Aboriginal peoples of Canada have the inherent right of self-
government within Canada” and that these governments should be recognized as “one of 
three orders of government in Canada”54, alongside the federal and provincial 
governments. 
 
2.9 The Charlottetown Accord and the Application of the Charter to First Nations   
The Charlottetown Accord also contained a provision respecting the application 
of the Charter to First Nations. More specifically, it proposed that the Charter should 
apply to First Nations’ governments and that Section 33 should be available to them to 
over-ride the Charter where appropriate, just as it is available to other governments in 
Canada.55 Additionally, it proposed that Section 25, the non-derogation clause, “be 
strengthened to ensure that nothing in the Charter abrogates or derogates from 
Aboriginal, treaty or other rights of Aboriginal peoples, and in particular any rights or 
freedoms relating to the exercise or protection of their languages, cultures or 
traditions.”56  
These proposals were accepted by Aboriginal leaders, the provinces, the 
territories and the Parliament of Canada. The Canadian public, including a majority of 
                                                 
54 Charlottetown Accord, 1992, Section 2(1)(b). 
55 Charlottetown Accord, Sec 43. 
56 Charlottetown Accord. Section A.2.2. 
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First Nations’ people on-reserves, had a different view and the Accord was defeated in a 
national referendum. The Accord proposed sweeping reform of the Senate, the Supreme 
Court and the Bank of Canada and it recommended that the Constitution recognize 
Canada as an economic and social union. It offered constitutional protection for the 
distinctiveness of Quebec. Many of these provisions were controversial and any one of 
them may have led to the eventual defeat of the proposal57. For First Nations’ leaders the 
defeat was particularly difficult given that previous constitutional conferences had been 
unable to achieve the same degree of consensus.  
Since the defeat of the Charlottetown Accord, Ottawa has moved incrementally 
toward implementing the Accord’s proposals through administrative policies and 
modern treaties. These initiatives will be examined later in Chapter 6. 
 
2.10 Conclusions 
 The Charter embodies many of the norms of Canada’s liberal democratic 
tradition. It provides freedom from state intervention unless that intervention can be 
justified in law.  It protects free speech, free expression and a free press. It guarantees 
citizens’ right to vote and run for office. It allows for mobility throughout Canada to live 
and work. It provides for important legal rights upon arrest and detention. It guarantees 
equality among citizens. These rights apply to the federal, provincial and territorial 
governments and they would apply to First Nations’ governments if this were negotiated 
or ordered by the courts.  The question remains regarding how First Nations will fit into 
this continuum of rights and freedoms in Canada. 
                                                 
57 The vote was 54.4% opposed, 44.6% in favour. Taken from  
http://www2.marianopolis.edu/quebechistory/stats/1992ref.htm, downloaded August 20, 2005. 
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 The Charter is consistent with Canada’s international obligations which 
represent a “yardstick against which to assess governmental performance or non-
performance”58 in terms of respecting and safeguarding the rights of citizens. Charter 
rights are generally considered to be individual rights. Individuals have rights to 
challenge government action that infringes on those rights. The Constitution Act, 1982 
also recognizes the group rights or interests of First Nations’ people in Section 35 and 
the Charter stipulates that these rights cannot be diminished by the Charter. Some 
believe that Charter rights and Aboriginal rights can co-exist. Others are concerned that 
the individuals’ rights contained in the Charter could be used to challenge or diminish 
the group rights of First Nations’ governments.  Ottawa, the provinces and First Nations’ 
agreed at Charlottetown to strengthen Section 25 to ensure that Aboriginal rights are not 
diminished. However, to date, this agreement has not been written into the Constitution 
Act, 1982. 
At the judicial level, the courts have not been asked to rule directly on whether 
the Charter applies to First Nations’ residents against their tribal governments. This may 
occur in the future. The courts have found, however, that the Indian Act is subject to the 
Charter and, by implication, so might be First Nations’ governments that are established 




                                                 




The Case Against the Application of the Charter to First Nations’ Governments 
 
3.0 Introduction 
As Chapter 2 indicates, the Charter is both a sword to advance individual claims 
against the government and a shield to protect against the excesses of government. The 
Charter has broad public support. A recent poll recorded Canadians’ support for the 
Charter at 88%.59 The Charter has been described as a “statement of nationhood” about 
Canada60 and even a “crucial symbol of citizenship.”61 Yet, during the past quarter 
century concerns have been expressed about the Charter and in particular, its application 
to First Nations’ governments. This chapter articulates three major arguments made by 
those who have concerns about the Charter’s application. The first is that the Charter 
should not be imposed on First Nations’ governments and their communities without 
further study and negotiation. A second argument is that the Charter is embedded with 
European values that at times conflict with Aboriginal communal values and traditions. 
The third argument is that the Charter could limit or stifle First Nations’ ability to 
govern their communities. 
 
3.1 The Argument Against Imposition  
To reiterate, Canada’s Constitution was patriated in 1982. The Constitution Act, 
1982 included the Charter and it recognized Aboriginal rights in Section 35. Aboriginal 
leaders quickly realized that these two elements of the new Constitution Act, 1982 might 
                                                 
59 From the Centre for Research and Information on Canada, 
http://www.cric.ca/en_html/guide/charter/charter.html#cric, downloaded March 16, 2005. 
60 These were the words of former Ontario William Davis, as cited in Romanow, Whyte and Leeson, 
Canada…Notwithstanding, 200.  
61 See Alan Cairns, 83. 
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be in conflict. Aboriginal people had been subjected to over one hundred years of 
colonial rule, where the national government essentially made decisions about their 
governance without their input or control. Still in 1982, with respect to the Charter, they 
again found themselves in a position where they were not consulted on fundamental 
governance issues. The history of colonialism had bred a deep suspicion of any federal 
legislation that encroached on Aboriginal sovereignty. Former Assembly of First 
Nations Grand Chief Ovide Mercredi commented on this cultural subjugation in 1993. 
He noted that since it was enacted, the Indian Act has been used “to deny our people our 
own identity.”62 The resulting dominance, he suggested, had produced a strong sense of 
victimization for First Nations peoples. “Every time we see the exercise of that 
dominance again, as in the Charter debate, we react as I do, with a sense of 
indignation.”63  
Aboriginal leaders at the time were not necessarily opposed to a charter of rights; 
they just did not want to see it imposed on their governments, and particularly their 
governments that were operating or would operate according to traditional Aboriginal 
norms and approaches. Chief Mercredi articulated their concern this way: 
“It is very important for people to understand that we are not opposed to the idea 
of a Charter, we are opposed to the imposition of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms on our peoples, which was prepared and adopted without our 
input.”64 
 
Mercredi acknowledged that all governments must respect individual rights and 
Aboriginal governments are not exempted from this. The problem, he argued, is that 
                                                 
62 Ovide Mercredi with Mary-Ellen Turpel Lafond. Into the Rapids – Navigating the Future of First 
Nations, (Penguin Books, 1993), 104. 
63 Mercredi, 104. 
64 Mercredi, 97. 
 28
“the Canadian Charter is not appropriate for us. We have our own approaches.”65 “In 
restoring ourselves as peoples, it is very important that we are not forced to emulate 
European-style, democratically-elected governments, since traditional forms of 
government may be the only way to ensure the recovery of our communities and our 
peoples”66 Chief Mercredi added that First Nations want to ensure that the rights of their 
peoples are guaranteed, “something they do not enjoy under the Canadian parliamentary 
system of government.”67 
Mercredi argued that the Charter was designed to fix problems that had been 
created by the Indian Act in the first place, as opposed to it enhancing First Nations’ 
governments.68 His concern turned out to be well-founded. One of the first major 
legislative changes precipitated by the Charter was Bill C-31, the amendment to the 
Indian Act that removed the section of that Act that disenfranchised women who married 
non-Aboriginal men.69 
Kent McNeil has addressed Mercredi’s ‘imposition argument’. His central thesis 
is that First Nations’ governments operate outside the scope of the Charter, by virtue of 
Section 35, 25 and 32 and that Aboriginal peoples must be consulted if this is to change. 
McNeil suggests that the consent of First Nations’ peoples’ “should be prerequisite” to 
the Charter being imposed on them.70  To do otherwise, he suggests, would “turn the 
clock back in time to when the Aboriginal peoples were often not given the opportunity 
to participate when important decisions affecting their constitutional rights were 
                                                 
65 Mercredi, 97. 
66  Mercredi, 98-99. 
67 Mercredi, 98-99. 
68 Mercredit, 97. 
69 See Canadian Congress of Aboriginal Peoples (CAP), notes from Harry Daniels, former CAP President 
in, “Bill C-31 the Abocide Bill”, found at http://www.abo-peoples.org/programs/C-31/Abocide/Abocide-
2.htm, retrieved July 24, 2005.  
70 Kent McNeil in Aboriginal Governments, 70. 
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made.”71 McNeil discourages “judicial activism” in imposing the Charter on First 
Nations as well. He argues that any application of the Charter to Aboriginal 
governments by the courts “should not be decided until the matter has been thoroughly 
investigated and publicly debated, and the consequences of applying the Charter to 
Aboriginal governments adequately understood.”72 He suggests that further 
“investigation and discussion” must take place that will lead to a political solution where 
an appropriate balance will be struck between individual and collective rights.73 
McNeil’s argument suggests that some political resolution might be possible. 
 
3.2 The Charter is embedded with European values Argument 
A second argument regarding the application of the Charter to First Nations’ 
governments and communities is that not repeats a pattern of imposition on their 
Aboriginal rights, but it is an imposition of values that are not shared by many First 
Nations’ people. This view is articulated by McNeil who suggests that the Charter is 
“designed to apply to parliamentary forms of government based on Euro-Canadian laws 
and traditions” and that these Western-European values may be inconsistent with 
Aboriginal traditions.74 Cree scholar Mary-Ellen Turpel had already made this argument 
more fully. Writing in 1991, she suggested that the principles upon which the Charter is 
based are “too individualistic and European” to apply to Aboriginal conceptions of 
citizenship.75  She asserted that the “rights paradigm” in Canada is generally 
                                                 
71 McNeil, 70-71. 
72 McNeil, 70-71. 
73 McNeil, 99. 
74 McNeil, 98. 
75 Mary-Ellen Turpel, "Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Charter: Interpretive Monopolies, Cultural 
Differences" (1989-90) 6 Canadian Human Rights Yearbook 3, 512. 
 30
“unreceptive to cultural differences.”76 Turpel also expressed concerns about the 
Canadian judicial system acting as the adjudicator of Aboriginal rights claims. She 
described the courts’ operational code as Euro-centric, “elitist and culturally-specific”77, 
one that does not acknowledge cultural differences. She added that the court system in 
Canada is an “adversarial and impersonal institution (that) is unknown among 
Aboriginal peoples.”78  She maintained that the Canadian judicial system operates within 
a “conceptual framework of rights derived from the theory of a natural right to private 
property.”79  
Patricia Monture shares many of Turpel’s sentiments in this regard. She believes 
the benefits of having the Charter apply to Aboriginal peoples in Canada has not been 
adequately demonstrated. She believes the Charter is “narrow instrument” that is not 
capable of taking into account “discrimination within discrimination” faced by many 
Aboriginal women.80 
For his part, Mercredi argued that “the Courts are expensive and slow and the 
Charter has fallen short of its objective of creating equality” for Aboriginal peoples.81 
Joseph Carens concurs with this view. He says the Charter is “embedded in a complex, 
costly, and alien legal system.” 82 Carens suggests that the conception that all laws must 
apply equally to all citizens is no longer adequate. He calls for overlapping laws, or 
differentiated citizenship, as a means of accommodating the cultural concerns of intra-
                                                 
76 Turpel, 527. 
77 Turpel, 513.  
78 Turpel, 513. 
79 Turpel, 513. 
80 Patricia A. Monture-Angus, Journeying Forward – Dreaming First Nations’ Independence. (Halifax: 
Fenwood Publishing, 1999), 150. Also Patricia Monture-Angus in Thunder in my Soul – A Mohawk 
Woman Speaks, (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 1995), 142-145. 
81 Mercredi in Rapids, 102. 
82 Joseph H. Carens. Culture, Citizenship and Community – A Contextual Exploration of Justice as 
Evenhandedness, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 193. 
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national groups like Aboriginal peoples.83 This view has been echoed by other scholars 
such as John Borrows and James Tully. Borrows argued that rights discourse is often 
antithetical to First Nations’ traditions. “Rights are often dismissed as a tool in 
overcoming subjugation because they seem prima facie incompatible with Aboriginal 
approaches to land, family, social life, personality and spirituality.”84  Rights can be 
applied in a culturally-biased manner, Borrows suggests, and individual rights claims 
may promote an ideology that everyone should be treated equally, regardless of 
disadvantages and differences.  The reality is that there are economic, social and 
political factors that create unequal access to justice for First Nations’ people.  
Borrows cautions that imposing the Charter on Aboriginal peoples will be 
contentious. “Ugly divisions” have already ensued over the integration of formerly 
disenfranchised women back in to Indian bands, according to Borrows. “[T]he battle 
over rights and the Charter is being fought in many First Nations.”85 He proposes that a 
better approach would be to “harmonize” Aboriginal legal values with Western common 
law to create an even more unique Aboriginal Canadian law, rather than simply 
imposing Western liberal values on Aboriginal peoples.86 Such a melding of inter-
societal concepts could benefit both communities: Aboriginal legal values would be 
recognized for their value and non-Aboriginal Canadians could benefit from Aboriginal 
solutions to many of today’s legal issues.  
                                                 
83 Carens, 176. 
84 John Borrows, “Contemporary Traditional Equality: The Effect of the Charter on First Nations Politics”, 
in Charting the Consequences: The Impact of the Charter of Rights on Canadian Law and Politics”, eds. 
David Schneiderman and Kate Sutherland, (University of Toronto Press, 1997), 2. 
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James Tully is a constitutional expert who agrees with those who have argued 
that the prevailing constitutional language tends to be Euro-centric, male, and colonial in 
nature.87 It promotes exclusion, uniformity, and assimilation, rather than integration, 
multiplicity, and diversity, he says. Historically, constitutions have held together 
culturally-homogeneous nations88; the language is authoritarian and imperial in nature. 
Although the modern conception of constitutional language is an improvement over 
previous language, it is nevertheless inadequate in terms of addressing contemporary 
demands of a diverse citizenry, such as Canada is experiencing with the Aboriginal 
population. Tully also advocates a form of differentiated citizenship to address 
Aboriginal concerns. He calls for overlapping legal and political structures, something 
he calls ‘diverse federalism’.89 Such a system is by no means unprecedented. As Tulley 
notes, Quebec has its own civil code and Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms and 
there is no reason why the Aboriginal population could not have their own rights code. 
He warns that Canada ignores the cultural claims of Aboriginal peoples at its own 
peril.90  
Aboriginal lawyer Dan Russell agrees that the Charter represents a collision of 
cultural values.91  He proposes that a better balance needs to be struck between the two 
competing perspectives, where the obligations to the community are given greater 
weight than they are given in the Charter.92 Russell acknowledges that individuals have 
rights within traditional Aboriginal communities, but these freedoms, at least in some 
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nations, such as Navajo communities, are “tempered by the teaching that they must also 
have proper regard for their clan duties and obligations.”93 Russell concludes: 
If Canadians are truly committed to the goal of Aboriginal people instituting 
their own forms of self-government, then they must give appropriate regard to 
Aboriginal expressions of this authority. Moreover, Aboriginal people are not 
unmindful of the value of protecting fundamental individual rights. Such liberties 
are perhaps more relevant to young people in Aboriginal communities. Thus, any 
self-government paradigm will no doubt include some for of individual rights 
protection – but it must also include some form of collective rights recognition.94 
 
Russell’s views are shared by Sto:Lo Nation elder Clarence Pennier.  When asked about 
the balance between individual rights and the interests of the community, elder Pennier 
said, “I don’t think we should probably reject the Charter of Rights. [But] it has to be 
accommodative of our collective rights.”95 
In sum, there are leaders and scholars who believe that the existence of the 
Charter creates the potential for a collision between individual rights and collective 
rights when the Charter is applied to First Nations’ people. Some First Nations’ people 
are seeking a greater balance between the rights of the individual and the duties to the 
community, where duties to the community are given greater weight. 
 
3.3 The Charter Could Limit First Nations’ Ability to Govern  
The third major argument regarding the application of the Charter to Aboriginal 
peoples and their governments as expressed by some is that it may limit rather than 
enhance First Nations’ governance.96 Dan Russell, for example, argues that proponents 
of the Charter are underestimating the impact the Charter might have on the cultural 
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rights and practices within Aboriginal communities.97 Joseph Carens believes the 
Charter “could greatly limit the capacity of Aboriginal people to develop their own 
distinctive arrangements for self-governance.”98   
Dan Russell and Will Kymlicka have identified several potential Charter 
challenges that First Nations might face if the Charter were to apply to their jurisdiction. 
For example, Russell examines how some First Nations choose their leadership through 
a clan system. He suggests that if the democratic rights in Section 3 were applied to 
these nations, thereby ensuring that every person has a right to vote or stand for public 
office, this “would surely constitute an attack on the clan system.”99 Russell also 
suggests that other Charter rights, such as the right not to incriminate oneself, might be 
inconsistent with Aboriginal traditions where one is required to “explain his or her 
actions” to the community.100 These values are “centuries old”, he says, and by 
enforcing these rights, accused First Nations’ individuals may “avoid their 
responsibilities to their communities.”101 Section 15, the equality rights section, “could 
prove troublesome for some Aboriginal communities” as well, according to Russell.102 
Some First Nations might require “participation in community activities determined by 
distinctions of gender, race, age or religion.”103 Failure to comply with these activities 
could result in sanctions being imposed on those who refused. Russell suggests that such 
sanctions might be challenged using Section 15.104 He poses these as hypothetical 
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examples of challenges that could be faced by First Nations’ governments using the 
Charter. 
Will Kymlicka identifies several potential Charter challenges that face First 
Nations’ governments including: restrictions on voting rights,105 limitations on mobility 
rights and First Nations’ residents’ ability to sell their land,106 and the right to educate 
their children in their Aboriginal language ahead of English or French.107 He suggests 
that special measures or special rights designed to protect Aboriginal traditions might be 
necessary to preserve important cultural traditions.108  
In effect, Kymlicka suggests that excessive attachment to the liberal principles of 
equality may compromise the principle of equity and fairness. Joseph Carens believes 
these threats to Aboriginal culture are real and that the concerns of Aboriginal leaders 
are “defensible and plausible.”109  
 
3.4 International Instruments That Preserve and Protect Culture 
On the issue of the Charter being compatible with international human rights 
instruments, Dan Russell points to several international agreements that guarantee 
collective rights or minority rights including the Convention Against Genocide, 1948, 
the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National Ethnic, Religious 
and Linguistic Minorities, 1992, the UNESCO Declaration of the Principles of 
International Cultural Cooperation, 1966, and the Draft U.N. Declaration on the Rights 
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of Indigenous Peoples 1994.110 According to Russell, together these documents stand for 
the “right to protection and continued expression of a people’s culture.” By applying the 
Charter to First Nations, he says, it could be argued that this “offends an Aboriginal 
community’s collective rights.”111 
 
3.5 Conclusions 
In sum, concerns with the application of the Charter to First Nations appear to 
revolve around three arguments. The first argument is that the Charter was imposed 
unilaterally in 1982, just as the Indian Act was imposed, and that such an imposition is 
contrary to the recognition of their rights. Some First Nations’ leaders are concerned that 
the Charter was designed more to fix problems created by the Indian Act than advancing 
their claims.  
The second argument is that the Charter is culturally incompatible with many 
Aboriginal traditions. The concern is that individual rights under the Charter may trump 
the rights of the community despite the fact that many Aboriginal communities believe 
that an individual owes duties to the community that supersede her or his own individual 
rights. Those who share this concern add that such a problem is likely to be compounded 
when Charter claims are adjudicated by a court system that is alien and sometimes even 
hostile to First Nations’ laws and customs.   
The third argument is that the Charter may restrict Aboriginal peoples’ hard-
fought right to greater self-determination.112 Aboriginal leaders have been very 
concerned that the application of the Charter to their governance system might be a 
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setback to their right of self-government. They believe that there is a contradiction 
between having the right to self-government, sovereignty on their territory, and having 
the Charter as an “external restriction” on their activities.113   
This chapter outlines a number of governance issues that could face potential 
Charter challenges. The potential collision of individual rights and group interests has 
been described as an “emotional minefield”114 and John Borrows suggests that “ugly 
divisions”115 have already taken place within First Nations’ communities over women’s 
rights and the application of the Charter to First Nations’ jurisdiction. Former Grand 
Chief Ovide Mercredi summed up his position on the Charter as follows: 
Who is to say that freedom of conscience and religion, freedom of thought and 
belief, freedom of association do not exist in our societies? Of course they exist. 
We believe in maximizing individual autonomy without sacrificing a sense of 
community responsibility. Our beliefs and values do not exist because the 
Canadian Charter says they exist. Our societies and cultures are older than 
Canada’s. Our values are part of who we are. The suggestion that we lack these 
attributes or that our values are wrong or inferior because they are not the same is 
insulting.116 
 
 These views indicate that the issue of the application of the Charter to First 
Nations’ jurisdiction continues to be hotly contested. A second school of thought does 
not have this same degree of concern about the application of the Charter. This school 
believes the Charter might actually assist in the de-colonization process. Chapter 4 
reviews the views of those who support the application of the Charter to First Nations’ 
jurisdiction. 
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Chapter 3 focused on the arguments of those who have concerns regarding the 
application of the Charter to First Nations’ governments and communities, this chapter 
reviews the views of those who support the application of the Charter. This includes the 
findings of RCAP. The argument in favour of the Charter’s application rests on two 
major propositions: first, that First Nations’ citizens should have the same rights against 
their governments as they have against the federal and provincial governments; and 
second, that the values and principles embodied by the Charter are not necessarily 
inconsistent with the Aboriginal traditions in some areas. This school of thought was 
bolstered by the findings of RCAP that recommended in 1996 that the Charter should 
apply to First Nations, just as it applies to other levels of government in Canada. 
 
4.1 First Nations’ People Should Have Charter Rights vis-à-vis their Governments 
Many Canadians, both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal, believe that First Nations’ 
citizens should have the same rights against their governments as they have vis-a-vis the 
federal and provincial governments; that “fellow citizens should be subject to the same 
legal regime.”117 This contention has been advanced by at least one Aboriginal 
organization.  The Native Women’s Association of Canada (NWAC) has been at the 
forefront of the debate in arguing that the Charter should and does apply to First 
Nations’ governments.  Its support for the application of the Charter is rooted in the idea 
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that prior to its entrenchment, reserve-based First Nations’ governments did not do 
enough to oppose the disenfranchisement of Aboriginal women who married outside 
their band. 118 It suggests that this type of discrimination continues today, as revealed in 
two national consultations held by the Association and a study done by Aboriginal 
women in British Columbia which found “evidence of Band discrimination against Bill 
C-31 reinstatees and their families, including exclusion from membership, not 
permitting residency on reserve, discrimination in housing and in education and health 
funding.”119 According to the former President of NWAC, Bill C-31 Indians face 
“nepotism and favouritism” and “negative stereo-typing” in trying to access Band 
benefits.120  NWAC supports the application of the Charter to First Nations’ 
governments. Its position was articulated cogently by John Borrows in “Contemporary 
Traditional Equality” as follows: 
“The Native Women’s Association of Canada supports individual rights. 
These rights are so fundamental that, once removed, you no longer have a 
human being. Aboriginal Women are human beings and we have rights 
which cannot be denied or removed at the whim of any government. 
These views are in conflict with many Aboriginal leaders and legal 
theoreticians who advocate for recognition by Canada of sovereignty, 
self-government and collective rights. It is the unwavering view of the 
Aboriginal male leadership that the ‘collective’ comes first, and that it 
will decide the rights of individuals. 
[NWAC] recognizes that there is a clash between collective rights of 
sovereign Aboriginal governments and individual rights of women. 
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Stripped of equality by patriarchal laws which created ‘male privilege’ as 
the norm on reserve lands, Aboriginal women have a tremendous struggle 
to regain their social position. We [NWAC] want the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms to apply to Aboriginal governments.”121 
 
Borrows suggests that while the Charter has its limitations or disadvantages, on 
balance it might assist with the development of First Nations’ governance. He examines 
how some Aboriginal women have been instrumental in affecting the outcome of three 
issues of importance to First Nations’ people both in shaping and in utilizing the 
Charter.  
In explaining their influence in shaping the Charter, Borrows notes that some 
Aboriginal women fought for an amendment to the Constitution Act, 1982 to guarantee 
gender equality on matters pertaining to Aboriginal and treaty rights.122  They were 
concerned that Section 25 might be used to neutralize Section 28, where the Charter 
guarantees gender equality. At the 1983 tri-lateral conference of Ottawa, involving the 
provinces and Aboriginal leaders, all parties agreed to the inclusion of Section 35(4) 
after intense lobbying by some Aboriginal women’s organizations.  Section 35(4) 
guarantees gender equality in matters under Aboriginal jurisdiction. It is part of the 
Constitution Act, 1982 and it operates outside the Charter. This provision was originally 
opposed by some Aboriginal leaders, including the Assembly of First Nations (AFN), 
because they believed that “sexual-equality protections were already implicit in Section 
35 as part of self-government.”123 The AFN based its position on First Nations’ inherent 
right to determine their own membership and citizenship within their communities. In 
the end, the AFN ultimately agreed with the proposed amendment. 
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In explaining how Aboriginal women have utilized the Charter, Borrows points 
to two important instances. The first instance was when some Aboriginal women fought 
for changes to the Indian Act to allow formerly disenfranchised First Nations’ women to 
return to their bands. NWAC lobbied the Government of Canada to amend the Indian 
Act on the basis that the disenfranchisement provision was likely out of step with the 
Charter. Ottawa accepted this position and amended the Indian Act before litigation was 
commenced. According to Borrows, Bill C-31 re-instated treaty rights and reconnected 
many Aboriginal people to their culture. This amendment was partially responsible, he 
suggests, for the growth of the status-Indian population by one-third in the past twenty 
years.124  
The second instance was when Aboriginal women were able to use the equality 
guarantees in the Charter to influence the national agenda during the debate that led to 
the Charlottetown Accord. Some Aboriginal women, again represented by NWAC, 
feared that the Accord might include measures that could adversely affect their right to 
equality. NWAC initiated two court cases against the framers of the Accord; the first 
sought funding and equal participation in the negotiations leading up to the Accord, and 
the second attempted to stop the referendum unless and until Aboriginal women secured 
a guarantee of equality in the Accord. NWAC was able to raise the profile of the 
equality rights struggle using rights discourse and the Charter.125  
Borrows points to these significant events to conclude that, on balance, the 
Charter might “augment political struggle and contribute to emancipation” of 
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Aboriginal people.126 The Charter might actually help Aboriginal people “disentangle” 
themselves from colonialism, he suggests.127 
NWAC’s position has been supported to a certain degree by Sharon McIvor and 
Teressa Nahanee, both Aboriginal lawyers. Writing for the Canadian Bar Association 
Task Force on Gender Equality in the Legal Profession, McIvor and Nahanee expressed 
concern for Aboriginal women living on reserves who find themselves without rights 
protection in law. They called for repeal of Section 67 of the Canadian Human Rights 
Act, 1985 that provides an exemption for action under the Indian Act128 and they called 
for a review of provincial and territorial human rights codes that are not applicable “on 
Indian lands”.129 
Borrows and others such as Patricia Monture are concerned with the use of 
litigation to advance rights claims. Monture said that while she does not fully disagree 
with NWAC’s approach in raising awareness of the issues facing Aboriginal women, she 
believes that NWAC’s litigation “wrongly represented Aboriginal women as all the 
same (or similarly situated)” and that its legal claim was “both adversarial and prefaced 
on a feminist construction of reality.”130 However, Borrows says that for Aboriginal 
women to litigate their claims is no different than First Nations themselves using rights 
arguments to advance their claims for self-determination. Borrows notes that accepting 
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the principles of the Charter is necessary in order for First Nations’ governments to 
claim legitimacy and to “facilitate the exercise of self-government powers.”131  
4.2 Charter Rights Might Not Be Inconsistent with Aboriginal Values 
The argument made by those concerned with the application of the Charter 
because of the dissonance between the Charter and the traditional Aboriginal values 
regarding individual rights and individual duties to the community has also been 
challenged by some scholars. They argue that the Charter principles and values may not 
be entirely inconsistent with Aboriginal values of respect for the community.   
One of the most cogent counter-arguments to the cultural inappropriateness of 
the application of the Charter to First Nations’ governments and communities was 
articulated by RCAP.  RCAP traced the history of respect for individual freedoms back 
into Aboriginal traditions, arguing that Aboriginal peoples are “no strangers to the 
doctrines of freedom and equality that animate the Charter”132, that these values were 
recorded as early as 1744 by French historians. In other words, the roots of the Charter 
are found in both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal traditions. RCAP added that Charter 
rights “can be viewed as the product of cultural fusion, stemming from inter-societal 
contacts in the villages and forests of North America, with effects that rippled outward 
into the salons and marketplaces of pre-revolutionary Europe.”133 
The authors of RCAP also addressed J.Y. Sakej Henderson’s argument, 
articulated earlier, that Section 25 of the Charter provides a “protective zone from the 
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colonialists’ rights paradigm.” 134 They maintain that this approach “distinguishes 
between the right of self-government proper and the exercise of governmental powers 
flowing from that right.”135 In other words, Section 25 protects the right of self-
government for Aboriginal peoples, but “individual members of Aboriginal groups, like 
other Canadians, enjoy Charter rights in their relations with governments and this 
protection extends to Aboriginal governments.” RCAP accepted the argument that, 
while Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 protects the right of self-government, the 
Charter protects the rights of citizens who reside under the jurisdiction of those 
governments. RCAP concluded that it “would be highly anomalous if Canadian citizens 
enjoyed the protection of the Charter in their relations with every government in Canada 
except for Aboriginal governments.” It recommended in the Final Report that the 
Charter “should hold good against all types and levels of governments, whether federal, 
Aboriginal, provincial or territorial.”136   
Borrows advanced similar arguments prior to the release of the RCAP report. He 
argued that the Charter contains precepts that were “traditionally endorsed by a 
considerable number of First Nations people”137 and that these principles need to be 
revived in order for First Nations’ governments to claim legitimacy. In making this 
point, Borrows explains traditions in his own family where the circle of life not only 
encompasses the four directions but encourages “honesty, sharing, strength and 
kindness.”138 Equality rights, he suggests, have added to existing Aboriginal traditions of 
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“gender symmetry and harmony”139 to create more equitable First Nations’ 
governments.  In an attempt at reconciliation of the Aboriginal and European 
governance and legal traditions, Borrows proposes a fusion of traditional Aboriginal law 
with Euro-Canadian law to form a truly Indigenous Canadian law. He adds that rather 
than being an obstacle for First Nations, the Charter offers them an opportunity to 
“recapture the strength of principles which were often eroded through government 
interference.”140  
Patricia Monture argues that the dichotomy of individual rights and group rights 
does not adequately capture Aboriginal conceptions of collective rights. Individual 
rights, she proposes, are rights than belong to individuals. Group rights are individual 
rights “bundle(d)…into a package.”141 Collective rights, she says, are similar to group 
rights in that they must be held by an identifiable group of individuals, but they are 
different in that collective rights belong to Aboriginal peoples because of the “distinct 
relationship with the territory that has become the Canadian state.”142 Monture suggests 
that the Canadian courts have had difficulty conceptualizing this difference, to the 
detriment of Canadian First Nations’ people and that is mischaracterization of 
Indigenous rights remains “an instrument of colonialism which we have not been able to 
banish from our lives.”143 
4.3 Conclusions 
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This chapter has shown that within Aboriginal communities there are those who 
believe that the Charter ought to apply to First Nations’ government. NWAC has been 
in the forefront of those who want the Charter to apply to First Nations’ government 
because of the historical discrimination faced by some Aboriginal women.144 However, 
NWAC’s position does not have the support of all Aboriginal women.145 Borrows 
suggests that Aboriginal traditions on rights need to be revived in order to bring 
symmetry and balance to these communities and that by and large, the Charter can help 
First Nations’ people “disentangle [them]selves from the web of enslavement.”146  This 
school of thought found support in RCAP which recommended the application of the 
Charter to First Nations.  
Chapter 5 examines a third perspective on the application of the Charter to First 
Nations’ governments, suggesting that the Charter might be acceptable if it does not 
diminish important Aboriginal customs and traditions. It also explores work that is being 
done to find alternatives to the Charter that might be more acceptable to First Nations’ 
people. 
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Alternative Approaches and Accommodations 
 
5.0 Introduction 
Chapters 3 and 4 provided an overview of two of the primary arguments over 
whether the Charter should apply to First Nations’ governments in Canada. This chapter 
explores the middle ground or rather the school of thought that says there are 
alternatives to having the Charter apply or not apply to First Nations’ governments. It 
identifies and examines the arguments advanced by those who say that the Charter 
might be acceptable so long as it honours and respects Aboriginal customs and laws. The 
chapter consists of four sections. The first section examines the views of several 
prominent Canadian philosophers who have addressed the issue of reconciling 
individual and group interests and how Section 25 of the Charter might be used to 
protect the group rights of First Nations if the Charter were applied to First Nations’ 
governments. The second section examines proposals and efforts to clarify and 
strengthen Section 25 to ensure, were the Charter to apply, that collective rights of First 
Nations would not be abrogated. The third section provides an overview of a set 
proposals and efforts to determine whether the Canadian Human Rights Act ought to 
apply to First Nations’ governments. The issues and options surrounding the application 
of the Canadian Human Rights Act to First Nations’ governments in many ways parallel 
those that arise in the context of the debate on the application of the Charter. The fourth 
section examines a proposal to develop an Aboriginal Charter of Rights and Freedoms as 
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an alternative to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. An Aboriginal Charter, 
as conceived by its proponents, would be a parallel to the Canadian Charter similar in 
effect to the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms.  
5.1 Section 25 and the Balance of Rights and Culture 
To reiterate, some scholars have expressed concerns that the imposition of the 
Charter is a continuation of colonialism and it may compromise important Aboriginal 
cultural traditions, even stifle Aboriginal governments. Dan Russell describes the 
imposition of the Charter as analogous to pulling a “red thread within a white fabric”147; 
it would take only a few lost threads to jeopardize Aboriginal cultural traditions. Many 
contemporary Canadian political philosophers accept that the preservation of cultural 
traditions, laws and customs is an important societal good and that special measures may 
be needed to protect such traditions, even if they are at odds with liberal principles of 
equal treatment for all. Liberal theorist Will Kymlicka, for example, goes so far as to 
suggests that “liberalism is incomplete” if it disregards the importance of culture.148 He 
and others have called for a sensitive balancing of competing rights, where cultural 
traditions are balanced alongside individual rights. In a similar vein, John Borrows 
suggests that individual rights and collective rights need not be “dichotomized”149 
because a strong individual rights regime can co-exist alongside measures to protect 
vulnerable cultures. 
Kymlicka suggests that an affirmation of individual rights together with a 
preservation of cultural rights will make a more vibrant society within which individuals 
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can lead the good life according to their beliefs. Not all scholars accept Kymlicka’s 
interpretation. Gordon Christie fundamentally disagrees with Kymlicka’s conceptions of 
liberalizing Aboriginal societies. He argues that liberalism itself poses a threat to 
Aboriginal peoples and may be “one source of the perception of oppression.”150 
Kymlicka suggests that the “political task, then, is to devise constitutional 
provisions…which will be flexible enough to allow for the legitimate claims of cultural 
membership, but which are also not so flexible as to allow systems of racial or cultural 
oppression.”151 Joseph Carens contributes to this discussion by proposing a paradigm for 
balancing competing claims where competing interests will be given “appropriate 
weight under the circumstances within the framework of a commitment to equal respect 
for all.”152  
The framers of the Constitution Act, 1982 understood the need for such balance. 
Section 25  was inserted into the Charter to serve as direction for the judiciary to weigh 
the impact of the Charter against the cultural interests of First Nations’ communities. In 
1995, James Tully examined several court decisions where the judiciary was required to 
strike a balance between rights and culture within those communities. One such case 
was Regina v Sparrow153 where the Supreme Court of Canada reviewed Aboriginal 
rights to commercial fishing and balanced those rights against the need for conservation 
measures to replenish fish stocks. The Court set out the principle in that case for 
balancing rights and culture. It ruled that where a prima facie case of an infringement of 
Aboriginal rights is determined, the onus shifts to the Crown to justify those 
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restrictions.154 It upheld the Aboriginal right to fish, but it also recognized the Crown’s 
right to regulate fisheries.   
In a second case, Thomas v Norris155, Tully has noted that the British Columbia 
Superior Court was required to carefully balance the right of individuals to exempt 
themselves from certain cultural ceremonies of a local band. Thomas claimed that he 
was falsely imprisoned and forced to go through an Aboriginal initiation ceremony. The 
defendants argued that their actions were a part of their Aboriginal traditions and were 
therefore protected by Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.  Section 25 of the 
Charter was not invoked here since the case was a civil suit and was not initiated against 
a government action. However, the Court determined that the Aboriginal right claimed 
under Section 35 was “not absolute” and that the plaintiff’s individual rights in the 
circumstances were “inviolable”. The Court stated, “While the plaintiff may have special 
rights and status in Canada as an Indian, the ‘original’ rights and freedoms he enjoys can 
be no less that those enjoyed by fellow citizens, Indian and non-Indian alike.”156  
Given court decisions in such cases, Tully suggests that the courts in Canada are 
inclined to be even-handed in situations where Charter rights come into conflict with 
Aboriginal rights. Section 25 is there to provide this appropriate balance and Tully 
suggests this should offer some solace to both Charter supporters and to those who fear 
its effects. Tully suggests that judges use a two-part test to balance rights and culture. 
They will ask: 
a. Is the cultural right being asserted “pressing and substantial”, and if so, 
                                                 
154 Analysis taken from http://www.aand.gov.ab.ca/PDFs/R.%20v.%20Douglas.pdf , retrieved August 25, 
2004. 
155 Thomas v Norris [1992] 2 CNLR 139 (BCSC ).  
156 Thomas v Norris, 28. 
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b. Is the limit on individual rights proportional?157 
In other words, if the Aboriginal right that is being protected is substantial, it may 
supersede or trump the individual right. On the other hand, if the Aboriginal right is not 
substantial and the infringement on the individual right is disproportional, the individual 
right may be the trump.  
This is the “sensitive balancing” of competing claims which Carens noted and 
promotes.158 According to Tully, finding this balance should satisfy both individual 
rights theorists and those who are concerned with the impact of individual rights upon 
cultural traditions and practices. In his words: 
If rights were applied without taking these cultural differences into 
account, the result would not be impartial. The dominant culture would in 
fact be imposed in each case. Therefore, there are no grounds for 
complaint from a defender of rights, for rights are rescued from being a 
tool of cultural domination. Conversely, a critic of rights has no reason to 
complain, for the alleged blindness to cultural differences has been 
corrected, yet without abandoning rights.159 
 
5.2 Strengthening Section 25 – The Charlottetown Accord and RCAP 
 
Tully believes that the current Section 25 may be the best hope for addressing 
Aboriginal concerns about the dilution of culture under the Charter, short of a 
constitutional amendment. To be certain that the existence of such protection would not 
be questioned or compromised, the federal government offered at Charlottetown to 
strengthen Section 25 to ensure that Aboriginal concerns were addressed. The 
Charlottetown Accord proposed that Section 25 should be “strengthened to ensure that 
nothing in the Charter abrogates or derogates from Aboriginal, treaty or other rights of 
                                                 
157 Tully, in Strange Multiplicity, 171. 
158 Carens, 12.  
159 Tully, 172-173. 
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Aboriginal peoples, and in particular any rights or freedoms relating to the exercise or 
protection of their languages, cultures or traditions.”160  Four years later RCAP agreed 
with this approach. In its final report it suggested that under Section 25, the Charter 
must be given a “flexible” interpretation that takes account of the “distinctive 
philosophies, traditions and cultural practices of Aboriginal peoples.”161 RCAP added 
that First Nations’ governments have the same access to Section 33, the notwithstanding 
clause, as other governments. The use of the notwithstanding clause would provide First 
Nations’ governments with some of the flexibility that they would want if they were to 
operate within the context of the Canadian Constitution. Section 33 would allow them to 
pass legislation notwithstanding the Charter to protect important cultural traditions or 
laws. Is must be noted that Section 33 has been seldom used by other levels of 
government because of the potential political consequences of over-riding the Charter. 
 
5.3 Review of the Canadian Human Rights Act  
One of the most significant efforts at finding ways to reconcile the rights of First 
Nations’ peoples with the governance powers of First Nations’ governments was 
undertaken in April of 1999 when Canada’s Justice Minister appointed an independent 
                                                 
160 Charlottetown Accord, section 43. 
161 Final Report – Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples – Recommendation 2.3.12.17. The 
Commission recommends: The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms applies to Aboriginal 
governments and regulates relations with individuals falling within their jurisdiction. However, under 
section 25, the Charter must be given a flexible interpretation that takes account of the distinctive 
philosophies, traditions and cultural practices of Aboriginal peoples. Moreover, under section 33, 
Aboriginal nations can pass notwithstanding clauses that suspend the operation of certain Charter sections 
for a period. Nevertheless, by virtue of sections 28 and 35(4) of the Constitution Act, 1982, Aboriginal 
women and men are in all cases guaranteed equal access to the inherent right of self-government and are 
entitled to equal treatment by their governments. Taken from http://www.ainc-
inac.gc.ca/ch/rcap/sg/sha6a_e.html, retrieved July 25, 2005. 
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panel to review the Canadian Human Rights Act, 1985.162 The Panel was chaired by 
Supreme Court Justice Gerald La Forest. The Panel examined whether the current 
exemption for actions under Section 67 the Indian Act in the Act ought to be repealed.163 
The ensuing discussion of that issue paralleled the discussion of balancing rights under 
the Charter. In its final report, the Panel recommended a “balancing of the values of the 
Aboriginal people and the need to preserve Aboriginal culture.”164 In practice, this 
would mean that adjudicators would “…actually hear evidence and representations on 
the issue of whether the interests of the individual and the community are properly 
balanced.”165 In order to ensure that this balance was maintained, the Panel 
recommended that an interpretative provision should be added to the Act which requires 
the “taking into account of Aboriginal community needs and aspirations in interpreting 
and applying rights” in cases involving Aboriginal governments. The Panel suggested 
that the balancing clause should be sufficient to “defeat a claim by an individual, who is 
unconnected with the community,” who might challenge a decision of the band using the 
Act.166 It concluded that an outright exemption for Aboriginal governments from human 
rights laws in Canada was “not appropriate”.167  
In its response to this report, NWAC proposed that the current exemption in the 
Canadian Human Rights Act for the Indian Act from the application of Act should be 
                                                 
162 Canadian Human Rights Act, 1985. R.S.C. Ch.H-6 as amended. 
163 Section 67 of the Canadian Human Rights Act states: “Nothing in this Act affects any provision of the 
Indian Act or any provision made under or pursuant to that Act.” 
164 Canada, Canadian Human Rights Act Review Panel, “Promoting Equality: A New Vision”, June 2000, 
found at http://canada.justice.gc.ca/chra/en/toc.html.  
165 CHRC Panel recommendations in Chapter 18 (c) found at: http://canada.justice.gc.ca/chra/en/frp-
c18.html#c. retrieved August 31, 2005. 
166 Ibid.   
167 Ibid. 
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repealed168and that a provision similar to Section 25 of the Charter should be inserted in 
the Act. They also called for a prohibition of discrimination against Indians who live off-
reserve or have had their Indian status restored under Bill C-31.169 This proposal 
parallels NWAC’s position on the application of the Charter to First Nations’ 
governments. 
Since the defeat of the Charlottetown Accord in 1992, no further action has been 
taken to amend the Constitution Act, 1982 to strengthen Section 25. Until this happens, it 
is possible that the courts will provide the appropriate balance, perhaps utilizing the 
considerations proffered by James Tully, when the appropriate cases come before them. 
5.4 An Aboriginal Charter of Rights  
 An alternative means that has been proposed for accommodating First Nations’ 
concerns about the imposition of the Charter is the enactment of an Aboriginal Charter 
that excludes the objectionable features of the Canadian Charter. One proponent of this 
idea is Dan Russell. In A Peoples Dream, Russell describes in some detail how an 
Aboriginal charter could strike a better balance between individual rights and collective 
rights. It could be drafted by Aboriginal people and would be more “accessible” to 
Aboriginal peoples because it would be drafted in familiar common language and 
concepts that Aboriginal peoples understand, rather than the unfamiliar legalist language 
and concepts contained in the Charter.170 An Aboriginal Charter would more clearly 
                                                 
168 The Canadian Human Rights Act, 1985, Section 67 states: “Nothing in this Act affects any provision of  
the Indian Act or any provision made under or pursuant to that Act.” 
169 Mary Eberts on behalf of the Native Women’s Association of Canada. “Aboriginal Rights are Human 
Rights”. Taken from http://canada.justice.gc.ca/chra/en/eberts.html, retrieved  September 9, 2003, page 3. 
170 Russell in Dream, 138. 
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spell out the duties owed to the community and the need for individuals to accept 
responsibility for their actions. It could provide one or more interpretive clause, similar 
to Section 1 of the current Charter that would give guidance to the courts, perhaps 
Aboriginal courts, on how the Charter was to be interpreted consistent with Aboriginal 
traditions. In short, it would interject a different language and a different set of cultural 
values and considerations into the ongoing rights discourse.  
In speaking about the possibility of an Aboriginal Charter, Ovide Mercredi 
suggests that such a document would better “reflect our values customs and 
aspirations.”171 It would also reflect Aboriginal ways of “dealing with disputes so they 
can be kept out of Canadian courts and away from the adversarial process.”172 Even 
NWAC has done some work towards developing an Aboriginal Charter of Rights.173 
 The idea has its own strengths and weaknesses. On the one hand, one pan-
Aboriginal Charter of Rights might not be acceptable to all Indian bands because 
traditions on rights may vary from one First Nations to another. On the other hand, the 
idea appears to have found some favour with some First Nations. As Chapter 6 will 
indicate, some modern treaties are now including provisions for a future Aboriginal 
Charter of Rights. This concept was given greater impetus in May, 2005 when 
representatives of the federal government and First Nations’ leaders agreed to a political 
accord that includes a provision that states, “Canada and the First Nations are committed 
to respecting human rights and applicable international human rights.”174 The Accord 
also urges First Nations to “respect the inherent dignity of all their people, whether 
                                                 
171 Mercredi in Rapids, 98. 
172 Mercredi, 98. 
173 See http://www.nwac-hq.org/AnAboriginalChaterRightsFreedoms.pdf. 
174 To view the complete accord, visit: http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/nr/prs/m-a2005/02665afn.pdf.  
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elders, women, youth or people living on or away from reserves.”175 Such an accord 
provides a political platform from which First Nations can adopt their own human rights 
laws. The constitutional platform is found in Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 
and Section 25 of the Charter.  John Borrows argues that this concept of blending 
traditional Aboriginal laws with western liberal traditions in law may lead to a truly 
unique form of Canadian law.176  
5.5 Conclusions 
In sum, whereas concern exists that Charter claims might dilute important 
cultural practices and traditions, others believe that Section 25 offers the best hope in the 
short term for protecting significant or important Aboriginal cultural practices and 
traditions. This school of thought suggests that Section 25 serves as direction to the 
judiciary to carefully balance competing claims for individual rights against the impact 
those rights might have on vulnerable and important cultural traditions. Rights and 
culture need not be always at odds with one another. Scholars from this school argue 
that given the difficulty with amending the Constitution, Section 25 of the Charter may 
be the best defense available to protect important Aboriginal and treaty rights.   
Not everyone agrees however that relying on Section 25 is the ideal solution. 
Individual First Nations or tribal confederacies may wish to develop their own charter, 
one that reflects their own traditions of balancing the rights of the individual with the 
duties owed to the community and one that is enforced by their own judicial system. 
                                                 
175 A First Nations – Federal Crown Political Accord, Section 8, as referenced above, retrieved July 25, 
2005. 
176 John Borrows , Recovering Canada, 4. 
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This option will undoubtedly be explored extensively in the future and could represent 
the longer term resolution to this debate for those First Nations who cannot accept the 





Negotiating Self-Government in Canada Today 
 
6.0 Introduction 
 Since the defeat of the Charlottetown Accord, Ottawa has moved incrementally 
toward implementation of greater self-governing authority for First Nations.177 A dozen 
or more modern treaties have been signed with First Nations since 1993 and more than 
eighty First Nations bands are negotiating self-government agreements across the 
country today.178 Canada is engaged in ongoing discussions on the possibility of First 
Nations’ governments as “third order government(s)”179 which are separate, distinct and 
substantially autonomous from the federal and provincial governments.  This process is 
guided by a number of federal government policies pertaining to self-government. One 
policy, the Inherent Right Policy (IRP), has two key elements: first, it accepts that self-
government is an inherent right of First Nations; and second, it states that the Charter 
must apply to these governments. 
 This chapter reviews the IRP and how it has been applied to negotiations with 
several First Nations’ agreements across Canada since the defeat of the Charlottetown 
                                                 
177 As indicated elsewhere in this thesis, First Nations’ governments take many forms. See Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Final Report, 1993, Chapter 1 – 1.3 as well as Hunter in “Self-
government”, 10.  
178 As at May 30, 2003. Source: Canada, Indian and Northern Affairs website: http://www.ainc-
inac.gc.ca/nr/prs/m-a2003/02324bk_e.html, retrieved April 16, 2005. 
179 This phrase was used in the Charlottetown Accord, Section 2(b) found at: 
http://www.ola.bc.ca/online/cf/documents/1992CHARLOTTETOWN.html.  
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Accord. It examines the role that the Charter is playing in these negotiations. While not 
definitive on this point, there appears to be a trend developing where some, though by no 
means either all of even most, First Nations are agreeing to the application of the 
Charter to their jurisdictions. Whether these First Nations believe they are truly free to 
accept the Charter or not is open to question. This chapter reveals that while some First 
Nations in Canada have been prepared to accept the application of the Charter to them, 
others are not prepared to do so. Whether the Charter will be accepted uniformly by all 
First Nations’ governments remains in doubt. 
  
6.1 The Inherent Right Policy (1995) 
The Charlottetown Accord affirmed explicitly that First Nations had never given 
up their inherent right to self-government and that this right continues today. The 
Accord also recommended that the Charter should apply to these governments. After the 
defeat of the Accord, Aboriginal leaders continued to press their claims for recognition 
of the right to self-government. With a national election pending, the Liberal Party of 
Canada promised in 1993 in its policy platform titled The Little Red Book that it would 
implement the provisions of Charlottetown incrementally by way of government policy 
through modern treaties and administrative agreements. Party Leader Jean Chrétien 
promised: 
The cornerstone of a new relationship with Aboriginal Peoples will be the 
recognition of the inherent right of Aboriginal self-government. A Liberal 
Government will act on the premise that the inherent right of self-government is 
an existing Aboriginal and treaty right within the meaning of section 35 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982.180  
                                                 




The Liberals won the 1993 election and two years later the Chrétien government 
adopted the IRP. This policy states: 
The Government of Canada recognizes the inherent right of self-government as 
an existing Aboriginal right under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. It 
recognizes, as well, that the inherent right may find expression in treaties, and in 
the context of the Crown's relationship with treaty First Nations. Recognition of 
the inherent right is based on the view that the Aboriginal peoples of Canada 
have the right to govern themselves in relation to matters that are internal to their 
communities, integral to their unique cultures, identities, traditions, languages 
and institutions, and with respect to their special relationship to their land and 
their resources.181 
 
This policy has created jurisdictional, if not constitutional, space for First Nations’ 
governments and it has guided federal action since 1995. It provides that Aboriginal 
self-government is recognized as an ‘inherent right’ under Section 35 of the 
Constitution. The types of governance models that could be produced within this self-
governance framework would range from municipal-style delegated governments, to 
governments that have negotiated specific jurisdiction or areas of governance, to tribal 
or inherent sovereignty governments that operate outside the Indian Act.182 
As RCAP noted, “Many concepts of Aboriginal governance centre on territorial 
jurisdiction. The Committee envisaged governments that exercise mandatory jurisdiction 
over a definite territory and all the people located there. However, there is a good deal of 
variation in the particular arrangements envisaged. Under some proposals, residency in 
the territory is limited to members of a specific Aboriginal group; under others, it is 
open to Canadians generally.”183 RCAP concluded that “other visions of Aboriginal 
                                                 
181Canada, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada. “Federal Policy Guide on Aboriginal Self-Government”, 
resourced at http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/pr/pub/sg/plcy_e.html, retrieved March 16, 2005. 
182 For a comprehensive survey of self-governing models, see Hunter in “Self-government”. 
183 RCAP Final Report, Chapter 1-1.3. 
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governance involve a form of communal rather than territorial jurisdiction. They 
envisage institutions serving the particular needs of Aboriginal people who live in areas 
with a mixed population and an existing government. The proposals usually relate to 
urban and semi-urban areas and centre on the creation of special Aboriginal service 
agencies, cultural institutions, school boards and so forth. These institutions would 
exercise voluntary rather than mandatory jurisdiction and so depend on the consent of 
the people they serve.”184 RCAP suggested that “these two basic forms of jurisdiction, 
while different, are not incompatible. As we will see, many Aboriginal visions of 
governance feature a mixture of territorial and communal elements. For example, some 
envisage governments that exercise mandatory jurisdiction over a specific territory and 
also a form of voluntary jurisdiction over citizens located outside that territory. Other 
proposals contemplate multi-level governmental structures incorporating a variety of 
semi-autonomous units, some exercising territorial jurisdiction, others communal 
jurisdiction.”185 
The federal government’s policy in support of self-government is not 
unconditional. The key condition embodied in the policy is that the Charter must apply 
to First Nations’ governments. The IRP states: 
The Government is committed to the principle that the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms should bind all governments in Canada, so that Aboriginal 
peoples and non-Aboriginal Canadians alike may continue to enjoy equally the 
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter. Self-government agreements, 
including treaties, will, therefore, have to provide that the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms applies to Aboriginal governments and institutions in 
relation to all matters within their respective jurisdictions and authorities.186 
 
                                                 
184 Ibid. 
185 Ibid. 
186 Federal Policy Guide. 
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Those who drafted the IRP anticipated First Nations’ concerns regarding the application 
of the Charter to their governance systems. Thus they tried to underscore that the 
Charter already applies; IRP states:   
The Charter itself already contains a provision (section 25) directing that it must 
be interpreted in a manner that respects Aboriginal and treaty rights, which 
would include, under the federal approach, the inherent right. The Charter is thus 
designed to ensure a sensitive balance between individual rights and freedoms, 
and the unique values and traditions of Aboriginal peoples in Canada.187 
 
The policy reflected Ottawa’s belief that Section 25 provided an adequate safe-guard for 
cultural traditions and laws. 
 
This policy gave the federal government the authority to begin negotiating new 
self-government agreements.  The notion of linking self-government with the application 
of the Charter was reinforced one year later when RCAP released its final report. As 
indicated in Chapter 4, it recommended that self-government should be recognized as a 
Section 35 right and that the Charter ought to apply to these governments.  Together, the 
IRP and RCAP’s Final Report would accelerate the pace of the federal government’s 
negotiations with First Nations over the next decade to de-construct the Indian Act and 
devolve self-governing authority to some First Nations, thereby establishing new third 
order governments. This has also precipitated a review by some First Nations’ leaders of 
the arguments for and against the application of the Charter to their jurisdiction.188   
                                                 
187 Federal Policy Guide, Part I, found at: http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/pr/pub/sg/plcy_e.html, retrieved 
August 31, 2005. 
188 At the time of writing, the IRP may have been superseded by the May 2005 First Nations – Federal 
Crown Political Accord signed between Ottawa and representatives of First Nations. This accord commits 
the signatories to cooperation on policy development regarding self-government, presumably as an 
alternative to unilateral Federal action. According to Grand Chief Phil Fontaine, “This political accord 
removes the straitjacket from federal policies and programs and sets the stage for a new relationship 
between First Nations and Canada and a new agenda for First Nations and Canada,” said National Chief 
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Between 1993 and 2004, approximately eleven modern treaties were signed, 
according to Frances Abele and Michael Prince,189 while literally dozens of negotiating 
tables were under way in many parts of the country negotiating administrative 
agreements or modern treaties. Many of these agreements contain a provision respecting 
the Charter. The objective in the remainder of this chapter is to provide an overview of 
some of those agreements. 
 
6.2 The Nisga’a Agreement in British Columbia  
In British Columbia, negotiations between the Nisga’a Nation and Canada over 
title to its ancestral lands date back as far as 1887.190 These negotiations culminated in 
1999 in an agreement that was ratified by three parties – the Nisga’a people and the 
Governments of Canada and British Columbia. This treaty stands out as a truly 
remarkable piece of modern-day treaty-making. It is a comprehensive agreement that 
facilitates the transition of the Nisga’a people away from administration by the Indian 
Act toward the Nisga’a Lisims government. It recognizes Nisga’a authority over the 
management of their land, the education for their children, their child welfare, and 
protection of the environment.191 The Nisga’a people continue to be recognized as 
Aboriginal people under Section 35 of the Constitution and they continue to be entitled 
to the rights and benefits of other Canadian citizens. The treaty touches on ownership of 
                                                                                                                                                
Fontaine. See AFN website at http://www.afn.ca/article.asp?id=1218 for the accord and the AFN position 
on it. 
189 Frances Abele with Michael J. Prince. “Constructing Political Space for Aboriginal Communities in 
Canada”, Paper given to Constructing Tomorrow’s Federalism Conference, Saskatchewan Institute of 
Public Policy, (Regina, March 24-26, 2004). 
190 Tom Molloy with Donald Ward, The World is Our Witness – the Historic Journey of the Nisga’a Into 
Canada, (Calgary: Fifth House Ltd., 2000), 21. 
191 The Nisga’a Treaty, 1999 found at: http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/pr/agr/nsga/nisdex_e.html and the 
Nisga’a Lisims Government homepage, at http://www.nisgaalisims.ca/treaty.html. 
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land regarding, among other things, the right of individuals to own land rather than land 
being communally-owned. The treaty also phases out the jurisdiction of the Indian Act 
over the Nisga’a Lisim Nation. It also stipulates that Nisga’a laws apply on its lands. 
Finally it stipulates that the Nisga’a will have a constitution that spells out the structure 
and functions of its government.192 The treaty also contains provisions regarding the 
rights of the Nisga’a Lisim government and people. In line with the IRP, the treaty 
proclaims: 
9. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms applies to Nisga'a Government 
in respect of all matters within its authority, bearing in mind the free and 
democratic nature of Nisga'a Government as set out in this Agreement.193 
 
This provision was agreed to by negotiators for the Nisga’a Lisims Nation and was 
ultimately ratified by the Nisga’a people. The agreement is likely to become a 
benchmark for other negotiations as it applies to both the powers that the federal 
government and the provinces are prepared to recognize for other First Nations, and 
respecting the provision that the Charter ought to apply. Similar terms were agreed to in 
principle with other First Nations in British Columbia including the Tsawwassen First 
Nations, the Lheidli T’enneh and Maa-Nult and other bands in that province.194 Charter 
rights are extended to the citizens of these First Nations, but Section 25 provides 
safeguards for perserving important cultural traditions. Tom Molloy, Chief Federal 
Negotiator in the Nisga’a talks, had this to say about rights and the role of the Charter in 
the Nisga’a agreement: 
                                                 
192 Nisga’a Treaty. 
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194 See B.C. Treaty Commission website for the latest updates at: 
http://www.bctreaty.net/files_3/updates.html, at July 25, 2005. 
 65
For those concerned about accountability and democratic processes, the Nisga’a 
Final Agreement has built-in safeguards comparable to any governmental or 
organizational constitution in Canada. Subject to restrictions of age and 
residency, all Nisga’a citizens are eligible to vote and hold office. Under the 
Agreement, the Nisga’a government must be democratically and financially 
accountable to its citizens. It must hold elections at least every five years. It must 
establish financial administration systems and conflict-of-interest rules 
comparable to standards generally acceptable for governments in Canada. And it 
must adhere to the General Provisions that explicitly states that the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms applies to the Nisga’a government and all Nisga’a 
citizens.195 
 
This agreement was subsequently ratified by the Nisga’a people and implementation 
continues today. 
 
6.3 Agreements in the Yukon and Northwest Territories 
Similar treaties have been signed in the Yukon.  In 1993, the Government of 
Canada reached an Umbrella Framework Agreement (UFA) with Yukon’s fourteen First 
Nations in 1993 representing some eight thousand Aboriginal people. The UFA includes 
the right of First Nations to sign self-government agreements separately with Ottawa.196 
Since then, seven First Nations have signed self-government agreements.197  
Parliament passed the Yukon First Nations’ Self-Government Act in 1994 to 
provide a legislative framework for self-government to develop in the Yukon Territory. 
This statute predated the IRP, which stated the position of the Government of Canada 
more clearly. Indian Affairs and Northern Development Minister, Ron Irwin, told the 
House of Commons during the debate on the Act in June 1994 that the “principles 
                                                 
195 Tom Molloy in Witness,191. 
196 See Indian and Northern Affairs Canada website, http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/pr/agr/umb/index_e.html 
for Chapter 24 of The Umbrella Final Agreement Between The Government Of Canada, The Council For 
Yukon Indians And The Government Of The Yukon. 
197 See Yukon Land Claims and Self-Government Agreement Annual Report, 2001-02 at http://www.ainc-
inac.gc.ca/pr/agr/ykn/yar02_e.pdf, retrieved April 14, 2005. 
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embodied in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Constitution of Canada as a 
whole will continue to apply [to Yukon First Nations]. First Nations constitutions will 
also provide protections for the rights and Freedoms of First Nations citizens.”198 The 
Yukon First Nations’ Self-Government Act requires that First Nations’ constitutions 
provide for the “recognition and protection of the rights and freedoms of citizens.”199 
The Ta’an Kwach’an Council (TKC), which is a signatory to the Umbrella Framework 
Agreement, approved its constitution with important principles related to the recognition 
and respect for individual rights and freedoms. It declares that its citizens have “…the 
right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law of the Ta’an Kwach’an Council 
without any discrimination, including discrimination based on status, religion, sex or 
disability.” 200 It also provides for freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression of 
its citizens, freedom of religion, the right of their citizens to be secure against 
unreasonable search or seizure, and the rights of its citizens to assembly peacefully. 201 
In the Northwest Territories, former Ontario Premier David Peterson has been 
appointed as the Chief Federal Negotiator to lead negotiations with First Nations there to 
settle outstanding land claims and devolve to them governing authority from Indian and 
Northern Affairs Canada. Issues under discussion include development and management 
of natural resources as well as control and administration of public lands. The goal is to 
enable the territories to become “more self-sufficient and prosperous and to play a 
stronger role in the Canadian federation.”202 The prevalent view among federal 
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200 Constitution of the Ta’an Kwach’an Council, taken from www.taan.ca, retrieved May 19, 2004. 
201 The Ta’an Kwach’an Council Constitution. 
202 Taken from Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, “Devolution in the Northwest Territories”, found at 
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government officials is that Aboriginal peoples will continue to be citizens of Canada 
and as such they will continue to enjoy the rights of this citizenship. Consistent with the 
IRP, the federal government’s position is that the Charter applies to Aboriginal 
governments in the far north “just as it does to all governments in Canada.”203  
A comprehensive land claim and self-government agreement was concluded with 
the Dogrib peoples of the Northwest Territories in 2003 that acknowledges the 
application of the Charter. The agreement provides that “The Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms applies to the Tlicho Government (which governs the Dog Rib Rae 
Band) in respect of all matters within its authority.”204  
 
In sum, First Nations in the Yukon and Northwest Territories are addressing 
rights issues within their jurisdictions as they negotiate land claims and self-government 
arrangements.  
 
6.4 Human Rights in Nunavut 
Comparable, and arguably even more significant, developments have also taken 
place in Nunavut where Inuit culture dominates. Nunavut received separate territorial 
status in 1999 by way of a constitutional amendment and the Charter applies by virtue 
of Sections 30 and 32.205 (See Appendix A). In 2003, the Nunavut legislature adopted a 
new Human Rights Act that addresses both individual rights as well as the preservation 
of Inuit customs and traditions. The preamble to that territorial statute states that the Act 
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204 Tlicho Land Claims and Self-Government Agreement, found at 
http://www.gov.nt.ca/MAA/agreements/tliagr2_e.pdf, retrieved April 15, 2005, Section 2.15.1. 
205 See Appendix 1. 
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must be interpreted consistent with Inuit traditions in the far north.206 That Act provides 
that: 
3. Nothing in this Act shall be construed as to abrogate or derogate from the 
protections provided for in the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement.  
4. For greater certainty, nothing in this Act shall be construed so as to abrogate 
or derogate from an existing aboriginal or treaty right of the aboriginal 
peoples of Canada under Section 35 of the Constitution Act of 1982.207 
 
This particular section of that Act serves as instruction to the judiciary to balance 
and accommodate Aboriginal traditions in the North against the individual rights 
contained in the Human Rights Code. This has not been an uncontested matter in 
Nunavut.  The recent debate in the Nunavut legislature regarding human rights 
protection for gays and lesbians led some to suggest that the recognition and protection 
of such rights is inconsistent with Inuit traditions. Enoki Irqittuq, MLA for Amittuq, said 
during the debate on the Human Rights Act, 2003: “In the South, people are free to do as 
they wish; for Inuit, I would outright refuse such a provision in the human rights act. It’s 
not our lifestyle.”208  
This could point to some future disagreements in Nunavut where individual 
rights collide with cultural traditions. When this occurs, James Tully’s two-part test 
might assist the courts in deciding which right trumps the other or where the appropriate 
balance lies. For example, if a landlord denied rental accommodation to a gay couple, 
based on traditional Inuit beliefs about marriages, a court may have to determine 
whether such beliefs are grounded in Inuit tradition and then weigh those beliefs against 
                                                 
206 Nunavut Legislative Assembly, Sixth Session, First Legislative Assembly, 2003, Bill 12. Bilingual 
version (Inuit/English) found at 
http://www.nunavutcourtofjustice.ca/library/statutes/2003/SNu_2003_12.pdf. 
 
207 Nunavut Human Rights  Act, 2003. 
208 “Nunavut MLA Denounces Homosexual Legislation”, April 11, 2003. From 
http://www.lifesite.net/ldn/2003/apr/03041109.html , retrieved September 9, 2003. 
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the individual’s right to housing without discrimination to determine where the 
appropriate balance lies. In doing so, the courts may need to consider evidence on the 
Inuit custom or tradition in question. 
 
 
6.5 Agreements in Saskatchewan 
In Saskatchewan, First Nations are governed by six numbered treaties: 2, 4, 5, 6, 
8, and 10. These treaties set out the relationship between First Nations and the Crown. In 
recent years, these First Nations have been examining different approaches to 
governance, including delegating some representative authority upward to tribal councils 
and ultimately to a provincial umbrella organization, the Federation of Saskatchewan 
Indian Nations (FSIN). The FSIN is one of Canada’s longest-serving provincial 
Aboriginal organizations, representing some seventy-four First Nations in 
Saskatchewan. Delegating authority to a provincial First Nations’ body would allow for 
some harmonization of laws among First Nations and would consolidate political 
bargaining power with a province-wide authority.209 An agreement-in-principle has been 
signed between the Saskatchewan government and the Federation of Saskatchewan 
Indian Nations that develops these concepts.  
With respect to the Charter, the Saskatchewan government adopts the position of 
the IRP that the Charter must apply to First Nations’ governments. A comprehensive 
agreement-in-principle was signed between Saskatchewan and the Meadow Lake First 
Nations (MLFN) in January of 2001 which states: 
                                                 
209 David C. Hawkes, Rebuilding the Relationship – The ‘Made in Saskatchewan’ Approach to First 
Nations Government. Presented to a conference: Reconfiguring Aboriginal-State Relations, (Queen’s 
University, Kingston, November 1-2, 2002). 
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5.03 Relationship of Final Agreement to other rights and freedoms 
(1) A MLFN Citizen who is a Canadian citizen or permanent resident of Canada 
will continue to be entitled to all the rights and benefits of Canadian citizenship. 
(2) A Final Agreement will provide that the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms applies to a MLFN Government. 
(3) A Final Agreement will not be construed so as to limit, prejudice or affect the 
application of section 25 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
(4) A Final Agreement will provide that, on MLFN Lands, MLFN Citizens and 
non-MLFN Citizens will have the benefit of the protection of human rights that 
is equivalent to the protection provided for in federal and provincial laws. 
(5) Prior to the form and content of a Final Agreement and a Tripartite Final 
Agreement being concluded by the negotiators for the Parties and Saskatchewan, 
the Parties will negotiate with respect to, and attempt to reach agreement on, 
matters relating to the application of the Canadian Human Rights Act.210 
  
An agreement in principle was signed between Canada, Saskatchewan and the 
Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations (FSIN) in May of 2000 where the parties 
committed to a process of negotiating greater self-government for Saskatchewan First 
Nations, including aggregation of authority from individual bands and tribal councils up 
to the Federation. This agreement includes a commitment to spell out the role of the 
Charter in the process.211 To date, this agreement has not yet been ratified by the parties. 
 
 Saskatchewan has a Treaty Commissioner who, in consultation with First 
Nations, is examining treaty renewal in this province. The application of the Charter to 
Saskatchewan First Nations is being discussed as part of this process, but to date no 
agreement has been reached or publicized.212 
                                                 
210 Comprehensive Agreement in Principle on Meadow Lake First Nations [MLFN] Government, January 
22, 2001. Found at http://www.graa.gov.sk.ca/aboriginal/html/documents/governance/mltc_caip.pdf, 
retrieved August 26, 2004. 
211 See the agreement at http://www.fnmr.gov.sk.ca/html/documents/governance/fsin_ct_process2000.pdf, 
downloaded July 25, 2005, Section 5(5)(vi). 
212 Personal conversation with the Treaty Commissioner in Saskatchewan, Judge David M. Arnot, April 
14, 2005. 
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 Saskatchewan First Nations are treaty First Nations, meaning the relations 
between the Government of Canada, the Province of Saskatchewan and Saskatchewan 
First Nations are governing by treaties, most of which pre-date the Charter. Some effort 
has been made to date to modernize these treaties or to strike agreements-in-principle 
that includes some discussion of the Charter, but at the time of writing these discussion 
have not been conclusive. 
6.6  Agreements in Ontario and Quebec 
Important self-government agreements have also been signed in Ontario and 
Quebec. In Ontario, a self-government agreement was concluded in 2003 with one tribal 
council, the United Anishnaabeg Councils (UAC), which represents four Indian bands in 
that province. The Anishnaabe Government Agreement is the first self-government 
agreement-in-principle in Ontario under the IRP. The agreement would “restore 
governing authority to First Nations members” and it will replace most of the Indian Act 
as it applies to the Anishnaabe peoples.213 In line with the IRP, the agreement proposes 
that the Charter “will continue to apply on First Nations’ land.”214 215 Some First 
                                                 
213 Canada, Indian and Northern Affairs, News release: “Gearing up for the First Self-government 
agreement in Ontario”, December 10, 2003. Taken from http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/nr/prs/s-d2003/2-
02457_e.html; retrieved April 15, 2005. 
214 Canada, Indian and Northern Affairs, “Backgrounder Highlights of Anishnaabe Government 
Agreement”, taken from http://www.ainc-inac.goc.ca/nr/prs/s-d2003/0257bk_e.html, retrieved April 15, 
2005.  
215 At the time of writing, this draft agreement had been rejected by the membership of the four bands that 
comprise the Council. The reasons for rejecting the agreement have not been publicized, nor is it clear that 
the application of the Charter was a factor in this vote. The parties have agreed to return to the negotiating 
table. See United Anishnaabeg Councils’ news release: 
http://www.uac.org/Images/02_release_jul2005.pdf as well as 
http://www.turtleisland.org/discussion/viewtopic.php?p=5888#5888, retrieved July 25, 2005. 
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Nations in Ontario do not agree with the Anishnaabe approach to negotiating the 
application of Charter.216  
In Quebec, a political accord was signed between the Nunavik Party and the 
Governments of Quebec and Canada in 1999 that established a Commission to examine 
“the structure, operations and powers of a government in Nunavik.”217 One of the over-
riding principles that guided these negotiations is that both the Charter and the Quebec 
Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms shall apply to any future Nunavik 
government.218 
 
 6.7 The Agreement in Northern Labrador - Nunatsiavut 
In Northern Labrador, the Inuit there have recently ratified a treaty similar to the 
one signed by the Nisga’a Nation in British Columbia. The treaty will result in the 
creation of the Inuit territory of Nunatsiavut. The agreement is very comprehensive and 
in line with the IRP in that it confirms that “The Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms applies to the Inuit Government in respect of all matters within its 
authority.”219 The agreement has an additional important provision regarding the 
protection of human rights within a constitution for that Inuit territory. The agreement 
states: 
17.3.4 The Labrador Inuit Constitution may provide for the following matters: 
(e) the recognition of Inuit customary law and the application of Inuit customary 
law to Inuit with respect to any matter within the jurisdiction and authority of the 
                                                 
216 Johnston in “Six Nations”. 
217 Quebec, Secretariat aux Affaires Autochotones, Nunavik Political Accord, taken from 
http://www.autochtones.gouv.qc.ca/relations_autochtones/ententes/inuits/19991105_en.htm, retrieved 
April 15, 2005.  
218 Ibid., Section 5.1(i). 
219 Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement, found at:  http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/pr/agr/labi/index_e.html 
2004, Section 2.18.1. 
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Nunatsiavut Government, as set out in the agreement, on condition that any 
recognition or application of Inuit customary law shall be proclaimed, published 
and registered in accordance with part 17.5; and 
(f) an Inuit charter of human rights.220 
 
This provision opens the door for the development of an Aboriginal or Inuit 
Charter as described in Chapter 5 and could be a new precedent for future negotiations 
elsewhere in Canada. It is consistent with agreements in the Yukon and in 
Saskatchewan. It may also signal a softening of the federal government policy regarding 
the application of the Charter provided there is comparable human rights protection 
available to the citizens of that First Nation. To date, no details on the nature or scope of 
an Inuit Charter of Rights have been articulated by the Labrador Inuit. In the meantime, 
the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Charter apply to the Inuit of Nunatsiavut, 
subject to the provisions of Section 25, the ‘non-abrogation, non-derogation’ clause. 
  
6.8 Conclusions 
First Nations have never given up their right to govern themselves; they have 
been self-governing for centuries. In the past one hundred and fifty years their ability to 
be self-governing has been limited by the Indian Act. They are now seeking a new 
relationship in Canada, one that returns to their more traditional governments and one 
that moves away from the colonialism of the Indian Act. Ottawa and the provinces 
appear willing to negotiate this evolution or devolution, but in exchange, they want to 
ensure that Aboriginal citizens have the same rights as other Canadians and the same 
rights as they have vis-à-vis the federal and provincial governments. Some First Nations 
have been willing to accept this exchange as part of the negotiation process. Acceptance 
                                                 
220 Ibid. Section 17.3.4 (e) and (f). 
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of the Charter may be occurring as a result of the IRP which stipulates that it is a 
condition for the federal government to sign self-governing agreements with First 
Nations.  
In reviewing the negotiations and content of such agreements one is reminded of 
Kent McNeil’s assertion that the application of the Charter should not be imposed 
without further investigation and negotiation. This is what is happening in many parts of 
Canada with some First Nations who have come to terms with the federal and provincial 
governments on the application of the Charter. Citizens under the authority of these 
agreements have accepted the application of the Charter.  Consequently, in these 
jurisdictions the Charter may provide an unambiguous legal instrument to shield these 
citizens from arbitrary or unfair action by their local First Nations’ governments. At the 
same time, First Nations’ governments that have allowed the application of the Charter 
are obligated to respect the intent and effect of the Charter. Consequently, as John 
Borrows noted, these governments may have greater legitimacy in the eyes of their own 
citizens.221 
It must be remembered, however, that to date only a handful of First Nations 
have agreed to the application of the Charter to their jurisdictions. For most of the more 
than six hundred First Nations that are governed under the Indian Act and who accept 
citizenship within Canada, whether the Charter applies to them and their citizens 
remains unclear. If one accepts Kent McNeil’s argument, these governments are free to 
operate outside the scope of the Charter unless either they agree or the courts rule 
otherwise.  
 
                                                 







This thesis has noted First Nations’ concerns respecting the application of the 
Charter to their jurisdiction. The Charter has the potential to challenge important 
cultural laws, customs and traditions. It may infringe upon the right to self-government. 
The history of colonial treatment of First Nations’ peoples by the federal government 
has bred a deep mistrust with legislation that is imposed on them. Many First Nations’ 
leaders and scholars believe that the inherent right to self-government means having the 
authority to develop or restore Aboriginal traditions respecting the rights of the 
individual as balanced against the duties owed to the community.  
On the other hand, not everyone agrees with this interpretation. Some Aboriginal 
scholars, backed by the recommendations of RCAP, believe that for those First Nations’ 
who have ceded to Canadian jurisdiction, protection of individual rights is an important 
aspect of governance in Canada today and that the principles contained in the Charter 
are not necessarily out of step with Aboriginal traditions pre-dating settlement. Those 
who support the application of the Charter to First Nations, point to Canada’s rich 
history of rights protection and maintain that this history is consistent with international 
developments in the western world. In short, this school of thought believes that rights 
transcend societies and their borders.  
These differences of view, for and against the application of the Charter, have 
the potential to divide First Nations’ communities. Some are very much against the 
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imposition of the Charter, while others are in favour. Some are apathetic toward the 
notion, as they struggle to meet the daily demands of governance on their First Nation. 
Yet another school of thought will continue to explore alternatives. As more Aboriginal 
lawyers enter the profession, they will craft compelling Section 25 arguments to 
convince the courts that the Charter ought not be allowed to infringe important cultural 
traditions.  
Within the school of thought that is exploring alternatives, there are those who 
will continue working on an Aboriginal Charter as an alternative to the Canadian 
Charter. Such a Charter would be drafted and ratified by First Nations’ people and 
would reflect their own particular traditions. These traditions may vary from First Nation 
to First Nation, depending on the customs and laws in that community.  The Labrador 
Inuit are one of the latest First Nations to have acquired the right through treaty to 
develop an Inuit Charter  and their handling of this issue may serve as a precedent for 
other First Nations. Central to the development of an Aboriginal Charter is the 
requirement to have or to develop a First Nations’ based justice system to administer and 
adjudicate such a regime of rights and freedoms. This will take the adjudication of rights 
issues on-reserve out of the hands of the European-based Canadian court system. 
Canada’s federal system is indeed able to accommodate the concept of a parallel rights 
process, as demonstrated both in Quebec with that province’s Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms and in other provinces with the provincial human rights codes. 
While the exploration of this and other alternatives continue, the Canadian court 
system will continue be called upon to determine whether the Charter applies to First 
Nations. Just as lawyers are likely to develop compelling Section 25 arguments, so are 
they likely to file claims against First Nations’ governments using the Charter.  First 
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Nations’ peoples in Canada, perhaps more particularly urban First Nations’ people who 
have lived in a liberal rights environment, are likely to utilize the Charter to advance 
their claims for equal access to services and benefits as compared to their counterparts 
on-reserve. This thesis noted at least three instances where band members filed claims 
against their band using the Charter. In two of the lower court decisions, Scrimbitt and 
Horseman, the Court had no difficulty accepting the argument that the Charter should 
apply to the First Nation in question. The third instance was the Corbiere case that 
determined that Indian bands that develop rules under the authority of the Indian Act 
must do so in a manner that respects the Charter. The Corbiere court decision stops just 
short of determining that the Charter applies to First Nations perhaps preferring to leave 
this to high-level constitutional negotiations. The next step is to ask the Supreme Court 
of Canada to address this question directly. But while a judicial finding that the Charter 
applies to First Nations’ jurisdiction may clarify a constitutional issue, it will likely lack 
popular support within many, if not all, First Nations’ communities who will see it as 
being forced upon them by the courts. 
Negotiating self-governance agreements with individual First Nations that 
contain provisions regarding the application of the Charter, or a reasonable alternative, 
seems to be the approach that the federal government will utilize in the near future and 
supporters of this approach have reason to be optimistic. Since the approval of the IRP, 
federal, provincial and some First Nations governments have been moving ahead with 
the self-government agenda and these negotiations have included some discussion of the 
application of the Charter.  To date, several First Nations’ governments have signed 
agreements that contained provisions regarding the application of the Charter to their 
jurisdiction.  Those First Nations’ governments that signed such agreements, and had 
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them ratified by their citizens, have provided their citizens explicitly with the same 
rights vis-a-vis their band governments as they have against the federal and provincial 
governments.  
For most First Nations however, the application of the Charter to their 
jurisdiction remains questionable. Most have not explicitly agreed to the application of 
the Charter to their affairs and some may never accede to its application.  Inherency 
governments that operate outside of the scope of the Indian Act or who have not ceded 
authority to Canada to pass laws that govern them will continue to maintain that 
Canadian laws have no application to them, that their relations with Canada should 
continue to operate on a nation-to-nation basis.  
Non-Aboriginal Canadians are very interested in the outcome of this debate. 
They see the Charter as a continuation of the liberal rights traditions in Canada and, as 
RCAP recommended, many believe the Charter ought to apply to all Canadians 
regardless of ancestry or place of residence. Support for the Charter is very high in 
Canada. According to the Centre for Research and Information on Canada 88% of 
Canadians support the Charter.222 Yet many Canadians also believe that government 
policy regarding First Nations’ people over the past one hundred and fifty years has been 
a failure and that many Aboriginal peoples remain economically marginalized.223  
Non-Aboriginal Canadians may be open to parallel systems, as they have been 
with the Quebec Charter of Rights and Freedoms provided that the basic tenets of 
western liberalism are respected.  Some scholars such as Alan Cairns believe that it is 
                                                 
222 See http://www.cric.ca/en_html/guide/charter/charter.html#cric. This survey did not analyse the results 
based on Aboriginal-non-Aboriginal ancestry. 
223 A recent study was completed by the Saskatchewan Institute of Public Policy entitled: Demographic 
Trends and Socio-Economic Sustainability in Saskatchewan: Some Policy Considerations by Janice 
Stokes, SIPP Senior Policy Analyst. Summary found at 
 http://www.uregina.ca/sipp/news/2003_oct31.html. 
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important for Canada to have national instruments, laws and customs that apply on a 
fairly uniform basis and that bring Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians closer 
together.224 The Charter is viewed as one such instrument, and in many respects among 
the most important ones.  
Whether the Charter will apply to First Nations’ governments could be decided 
through negotiations between the federal government and individual First Nations. If the 
current trajectory of the courts’ interpretation of this issue continues along the lines of 
the Supreme Court’s decision in the Corbiere case and the lower courts’ decisions in the 
Scrimbitt and Horseman cases which found that the Charter had some application to the 
facts in these cases, the Charter may well likely end up being imposed either completely 
or partially by the courts in specific cases. Whether First Nations’ citizens want those 
same rights vis-à-vis their own governments as they along with other Canadians possess 
vis-à-vis the federal, provincial and territorial governments or whether they favour 
operating according to comparable rights that exist either under traditional forms of 
Aboriginal governance, which may or may not be articulated in an Aboriginal Charter, is 
still unclear and will no doubt be influenced by self-government negotiations and by 
rulings of the Supreme Court of Canada.   
 
 
                                                 
224See Alan C. Cairns’ in Citizens Plus, 5-9, as well as in “Bridging the Divide between Aboriginal 
Peoples and the Canadian State”, Centre for Research and Information on Canada Papers, June 2001, 




The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms225 
 
Whereas Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God and 
the rule of law: 
Guarantee of Rights and Freedoms  
 
Rights and freedoms in Canada    1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to 
such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.  
Fundamental Freedoms  
Fundamental freedoms    2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:  
a) freedom of conscience and religion;  
b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, 
including freedom of the press and other media of 
communication;  
c) freedom of peaceful assembly; and  
d) freedom of association.  
Democratic Rights 
Democratic rights of citizens     3. Every citizen of Canada has the right to vote in an 
election of members of the House of Commons or of a 
legislative assembly and to be qualified for membership 
therein.  
Maximum duration of legislative 
bodies     4. (1) No House of Commons and no legislative assembly 
shall continue for longer than five years from the date fixed 
for the return of the writs of a general election of its members. 
Continuation in special circumstances     (2) In time of real or apprehended war, invasion or 
insurrection, a House of Commons may be continued by 
Parliament and a legislative assembly may be continued by 
the legislature beyond five years if such continuation is not 
opposed by the votes of more than one-third of the members 
of the House of Commons or the legislative assembly, as the 
case may be.  
                                                 
225 Taken from http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/charter/, downloaded March 28, 2005. 
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Annual sitting of legislative bodies     5. There shall be a sitting of Parliament and of each 
legislature at least once every twelve months  
Mobility Rights  
Mobility of citizens    6. (1) Every citizen of Canada has the right to enter, remain 
in and leave Canada. 
Rights to move and gain livelihood    (2) Every citizen of Canada and every person who has the 
status of a permanent resident of Canada has the right  
a) to move to and take up residence in any province; 
and  
b) to pursue the gaining of a livelihood in any 
province.  
Limitation (3) The rights specified in subsection (2) are subject to  
a) any laws or practices of general application in force 
in a province other than those that discriminate among 
persons primarily on the basis of province of present 
or previous residence; and  
b) any laws providing for reasonable residency 
requirements as a qualification for the receipt of 
publicly provided social services. 
Affirmative action programs    (4) Subsections (2) and (3) do not preclude any law, 
program or activity that has as its object the amelioration in a 
province of conditions of individuals in that province who are 
socially or economically disadvantaged if the rate of 
employment in that province is below the rate of employment 
in Canada.  
Legal Rights  
Life, liberty and security of person    7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the 
person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in 
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. 
Search or seizure    8. Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable 
search or seizure. 
Detention or imprisonment    9. Everyone has the right not to be arbitrarily detained or 
imprisoned. 
Arrest or detention    10. Everyone has the right on arrest or detention  
a) to be informed promptly of the reasons therefore;  
b) to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to 
be informed of that right; and  
c) to have the validity of the detention determined by 
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way of habeas corpus and to be released if the 
detention is not lawful. 
Proceedings in criminal and penal 
matters    11. Any person charged with an offence has the right  
a) to be informed without unreasonable delay of the 
specific offence;  
b) to be tried within a reasonable time;  
c) not to be compelled to be a witness in proceedings 
against that person in respect of the offence;  
d) to be presumed innocent until proven guilty 
according to law in a fair and public hearing by an 
independent and impartial tribunal;  
e) not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause;  
f) except in the case of an offence under military law 
tried before a military tribunal, to the benefit of trial 
by jury where the maximum punishment for the 
offence is imprisonment for five years or a more 
severe punishment;  
g) not to be found guilty on account of any act or 
omission unless, at the time of the act or omission, it 
constituted an offence under Canadian or international 
law or was criminal according to the general principles 
of law recognized by the community of nations;  
h) if finally acquitted of the offence, not to be tried for 
it again and, if finally found guilty and punished for 
the offence, not to be tried or punished for it again; 
and  
i) if found guilty of the offence and if the punishment 
for the offence has been varied between the time of 
commission and the time of sentencing, to the benefit 
of the lesser punishment. 
Treatment or punishment    12. Everyone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel 
and unusual treatment or punishment.  
Self-crimination    13. A witness who testifies in any proceedings has the right 
not to have any incriminating evidence so given used to 
incriminate that witness in any other proceedings, except in a 
prosecution for perjury or for the giving of contradictory 
evidence. 
Interpreter    14. A party or witness in any proceedings who does not 
understand or speak the language in which the proceedings 
are conducted or who is deaf has the right to the assistance of 
an interpreter.  
Equality Rights 
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Equality before and under law and 
equal protection and benefit of law    15. (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law 
and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of 
the law without discrimination and, in particular, without 
discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, 
religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. 
Affirmative action programs    (2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or 
activity that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of 
disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are 
disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, 
colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.  
Official Languages of Canada 
Official languages of Canada    16. (1) English and French are the official languages of 
Canada and have equality of status and equal rights and 
privileges as to their use in all institutions of the Parliament 
and government of Canada. 
Official languages of New Brunswick    (2) English and French are the official languages of New 
Brunswick and have equality of status and equal rights and 
privileges as to their use in all institutions of the legislature 
and government of New Brunswick. 
Advancement of status and use    (3) Nothing in this Charter limits the authority of Parliament 
or a legislature to advance the equality of status or use of 
English and French. 
English and French linguistic 
communities in New Brunswick    16.1. (1) The English linguistic community and the French 
linguistic community in New Brunswick have equality of 
status and equal rights and privileges, including the right to 
distinct educational institutions and such distinct cultural 
institutions as are necessary for the preservation and 
promotion of those communities. 
Role of the legislature and 
government of New Brunswick    (2) The role of the legislature and government of New 
Brunswick to preserve and promote the status, rights and 
privileges referred to in subsection (1) is affirmed.  
Proceedings of Parliament    17. (1) Everyone has the right to use English or French in 
any debates and other proceedings of Parliament. 
Proceedings of New Brunswick 
legislature    (2) Everyone has the right to use English or French in any 
debates and other proceedings of the legislature of New 
Brunswick.  
Parliamentary statutes and records    18. (1) The statutes, records and journals of Parliament shall 
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be printed and published in English and French and both 
language versions are equally authoritative.  
New Brunswick statutes and records    (2) The statutes, records and journals of the legislature of 
New Brunswick shall be printed and published in English and 
French and both language versions are equally authoritative. 
Proceedings in courts established by 
Parliament    19. (1) Either English or French may be used by any person 
in, or in any pleading in or process issuing from, any court 
established by Parliament. 
Proceedings in New Brunswick 
courts    (2) Either English or French may be used by any person in, 
or in any pleading in or process issuing from, any court of 
New Brunswick. 
Communications by public with 
federal institutions    20. (1) Any member of the public in Canada has the right to 
communicate with, and to receive available services from, any 
head or central office of an institution of the Parliament or 
government of Canada in English or French, and has the same 
right with respect to any other office of any such institution 
where  
a) there is a significant demand for communications 
with and services from that office in such language; or  
b) due to the nature of the office, it is reasonable that 
communications with and services from that office be 
available in both English and French. 
Communications by public with New 
Brunswick institutions    (2) Any member of the public in New Brunswick has the 
right to communicate with, and to receive available services 
from, any office of an institution of the legislature or 
government of New Brunswick in English or French. 
Continuation of existing 
constitutional provisions    21. Nothing in sections 16 to 20 abrogates or derogates from 
any right, privilege or obligation with respect to the English 
and French languages, or either of them, that exists or is 
continued by virtue of any other provision of the Constitution 
of Canada. 
Rights and privileges preserved    22. Nothing in sections 16 to 20 abrogates or derogates from 
any legal or customary right or privilege acquired or enjoyed 
either before or after the coming into force of this Charter 
with respect to any language that is not English or French.  
Minority Language Educational Rights 
Language of instruction    23. (1) Citizens of Canada  
a) whose first language learned and still understood is 
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that of the English or French linguistic minority 
population of the province in which they reside, or  
b) who have received their primary school instruction 
in Canada in English or French and reside in a 
province where the language in which they received 
that instruction is the language of the English or 
French linguistic minority population of the province, 
have the right to have their children receive primary and 
secondary school instruction in that language in that province. 
Continuity of language instruction    (2) Citizens of Canada of whom any child has received or is 
receiving primary or secondary school instruction in English 
or French in Canada, have the right to have all their children 
receive primary and secondary school instruction in the same 
language. 
Application where numbers warrant    (3) The right of citizens of Canada under subsections (1) 
and (2) to have their children receive primary and secondary 
school instruction in the language of the English or French 
linguistic minority population of a province  
a) applies wherever in the province the number of 
children of citizens who have such a right is sufficient 
to warrant the provision to them out of public funds of 
minority language instruction; and  
b) includes, where the number of those children so 
warrants, the right to have them receive that 
instruction in minority language educational facilities 
provided out of public funds.  
Enforcement 
Enforcement of guaranteed rignts and 
freedoms    24. (1) Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by 
this Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a 
court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the 
court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances. 
Exclusion of evidence bringing 
administration of justice into 
disrepute 
   (2) Where, in proceedings under subsection (1), a court 
concludes that evidence was obtained in a manner that 
infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by this 
Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is established that, 
having regard to all the circumstances, the admission of it in 
the proceedings would bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute.  
General 
Aboriginal rights and freedoms not 
affected by Charter    25. The guarantee in this Charter of certain rights and 
freedoms shall not be construed so as to abrogate or derogate 
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from any aboriginal, treaty or other rights or freedoms that 
pertain to the aboriginal peoples of Canada including  
a) any rights or freedoms that have been recognized by 
the Royal Proclamation of October 7, 1763; and  
b) any rights or freedoms that now exist by way of 
land claims agreements or may be so acquired. 
Other rights and freedoms not 
affected by Charter    26. The guarantee in this Charter of certain rights and 
freedoms shall not be construed as denying the existence of 
any other rights or freedoms that exist in Canada. 
Multicultural heritage    27. This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent 
with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural 
heritage of Canadians. 
Rights guaranteed equally to both 
sexes    28. Notwithstanding anything in this Charter, the rights and 
freedoms referred to in it are guaranteed equally to male and 
female persons. 
Rights respecting certain schools 
preserved    29. Nothing in this Charter abrogates or derogates from any 
rights or privileges guaranteed by or under the Constitution of 
Canada in respect of denominational, separate or dissentient 
schools.(93) 
Application to territories and 
territorial authorities    30. A reference in this Charter to a Province or to the 
legislative assembly or legislature of a province shall be 
deemed to include a reference to the Yukon Territory and the 
Northwest Territories, or to the appropriate legislative 
authority thereof, as the case may be. 
Legislative powers not extended    31. Nothing in this Charter extends the legislative powers of 
any body or authority.  
Application of Charter 
Application of Charter    32. (1)This Charter applies  
a) to the Parliament and government of Canada in 
respect of all matters within the authority of 
Parliament including all matters relating to the Yukon 
Territory and Northwest Territories; and  
b) to the legislature and government of each province 
in respect of all matters within the authority of the 
legislature of each province. 
Exception    (2) Notwithstanding subsection (1), section 15 shall not 
have effect until three years after this section comes into 
force. 
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Exception where express declaration    33. (1) Parliament or the legislature of a province may 
expressly declare in an Act of Parliament or of the legislature, 
as the case may be, that the Act or a provision thereof shall 
operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or 
sections 7 to 15 of this Charter. 
Operation of exception    (2) An Act or a provision of an Act in respect of which a 
declaration made under this section is in effect shall have such 
operation as it would have but for the provision of this 
Charter referred to in the declaration. 
Five year limitation    (3) A declaration made under subsection (1) shall cease to 
have effect five years after it comes into force or on such 
earlier date as may be specified in the declaration. 
Re-enactment    (4) Parliament or the legislature of a province may re-enact 
a declaration made under subsection (1). 
Five year limitation    (5) Subsection (3) applies in respect of a re-enactment made 
under subsection (4).  
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